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ABSTRACT
Scholars are divided on how to assess the Supreme Court’s recent trio of juvenile life-without-parole (“LWOP”)
cases. Some extol the cases as exemplars of the Court’s “moral leadership,” heralding a “revolution in juvenile
justice” and perhaps also auguring shifts in the Court’s jurisprudence of adult punishment. Others are more
pessimistic, arguing that the cases solidify a two-track approach in which there is one Eighth Amendment for
juveniles and one for adults, and the juvenile LWOP cases are unlikely to have any broader significance. This
Article doubles down on the latter, more pessimistic reading. A close reading of the opinions themselves, focusing
on the Justices’ rhetoric and situating that rhetoric within historical context, reveals that a near-majority of the
Court (and possibly a majority, with the replacement of Justice Kennedy, although that remains to be seen)
would not only permit juvenile LWOP sentences but affirmatively favors the project of mass incarceration that
states have embarked upon in the past forty years. This wing of the Court reads the Eighth Amendment as
punishment-facilitating, through the lens of what might be called “carceral conservatism.” The remainder of the
Court supports greater procedural regulation of mass incarceration at its extremes, but appears to broadly accept
the core justifications for lengthy imprisonment for ordinary adults. This wing of the Court reads the Eighth
Amendment as punishment-regulating, through the lens of what might be called “carceral proceduralism.” Far
from examples of moral leadership, the juvenile LWOP cases may exemplify the Court’s moral uselessness in the
face of mass incarceration. This Article concludes by briefly gesturing at some alternative principles that might
animate a more robust or “carceral skeptic” jurisprudence, drawing on prison abolitionist thought, international
comparisons, and originalist scholarship.
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INTRODUCTION
Earlier this year, the Louisiana Board of Pardons and Paroles denied
parole to Henry Montgomery.1 Henry Montgomery is seventy-one years
old and has lived at Angola state prison for the majority of his life.2 Now, I
suppose, he will go on living there. When he shot and killed a sheriff’s
deputy in Baton Rouge, in November 1963, he had just turned seventeen,
and he was sentenced to life in prison.3 The only reason Montgomery even
had a parole hearing is that, two years ago, the United States Supreme
Court mandated that Louisiana give him one. In Montgomery v. Louisiana,
the Court reaffirmed an earlier holding that mandatory life-without-parole
(“LWOP”) is unconstitutional for juveniles, and further held that this rule
applies retroactively, even to people like Montgomery who received life
sentences as teenagers long ago.4 The Court did not require that state
prison officials actually release Montgomery or anyone else. Only that they

1

2

3
4

Associated Press, His Case Helped Change the Law for Juvenile Offenders, But After Serving 54 Years He Was
Denied Parole, ATLANTA BLACK STAR (Feb. 19, 2018), https://atlantablackstar.com/2018/02/
19/case-helped-change-law-juvenile-offenders-serving-54-years-denied-parole/.
Bryn Stole, Will 71-Year-Old Baton Rouge Man who Killed Deputy Leave Prison Before He Dies? It’s
Possible, ADVOCATE (June 21, 2017, 10:54 AM), https://www.theadvocate.com/
article_fa13d3a4-5699-11e7-b440-4b5b249d116e.html.
Id.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
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think about it.5 People sometimes do horrible things when they are
“children,” Justice Kennedy wrote, but sometimes those same people
“change.”6
Most of Montgomery’s relatives have passed away by now, but he has a
cousin, who visits him in prison.7 They played together as children, at their
grandparents’ farm. “I remember him playing with the horses,” she told a
newspaper reporter, “teaching me to ride, explaining the different
animals.”8 As I read about Montgomery’s case, I learned also about other
children. Charles Hurt, the sheriff’s deputy, had three children. His
daughter, Becky, was nine when she lost her father.9 She is now an adult,
Becky Wilson, and when two years ago the Supreme Court considered
Montgomery’s case, she filed a brief urging the justices not to disturb his
sentence. “Wilson believes that forgiveness is a personal issue—and she has
forgiven Montgomery,” the brief explained.10 In fact, although I read this
somewhere else, Wilson and her sister once visited Angola and met with
Montgomery.11 But parole hearings would “retraumatize” her and her
family, she said, “forcing them to relive the events that traumatized
them.”12 So it seems that no one involved was particularly helped by the
Court’s ruling. Not particularly helping anyone is an apt characterization
of a lot of recent Supreme Court decisions. The suggestion of this Article is
that the more representative clue about the likely future trajectory of the
constitutional law of punishment in the United States is not that the
Supreme Court ordered Louisiana to provide Henry Montgomery with a
parole hearing, but that Henry Montgomery remains in prison.13

5

6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13

See id. (explaining that states retain discretion whether to release juvenile offenders, thereby
ensuring that “[t]hose prisoners who have shown an inability to reform will continue to serve life
sentences”).
Id.
Id.
Stole, supra note 2.
Brief Amicus Curiae of Becky Wilson & the Nat’l Ass’n of Victims of Juvenile Murderers in
Support of Respondent at 12, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (No. 14-280)
[hereinafter Wilson Brief].
Id. at 1.
Stole, supra note 2.
Wilson Brief, supra note 9, at 3.
See Ashley Nellis, For Henry Montgomery, a Catch-22, MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 28, 2018, 10:00
PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/02/28/for-henry-montgomery-a-catch-22 (“If
Henry Montgomery’s situation is any indication of how the Court’s ruling will continue to play
out across the country, it’s a sad commentary on the meaning of justice today.”).
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The idea that people might “change” between childhood and
adulthood—that there is a life stage called “adolescence,” during which a
person is not yet a fixed character—constituted the central premise of three
recent cases, including Montgomery’s, in which juvenile justice advocates
persuaded the Supreme Court to carve out an adolescence exception to the
constitutional law of criminal punishment.
Though the Eighth
Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments,”14 the Court has
historically interpreted that provision so narrowly that in practice, and
especially outside of the death penalty context, it does not ordinarily
function as a meaningful constraint on the government’s power to punish.15
As it applies to children and teenagers, however, the Roberts Court has
infused the clause with slightly more meaning. The Rehnquist Court had
already held, in 2005, that children under eighteen could not be sentenced
to death.16 Then, in Graham v. Florida (2010), Miller v. Alabama (2012), and
finally Montgomery, the Roberts Court took some incremental steps further.
Pronouncing that “age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment,” the Court
held that children under the age of eighteen may not be sentenced to lifewithout-parole for non-homicide crimes, and may be sentenced to lifewithout-parole for homicide crimes only upon an individualized sentencing
determination, invalidating twenty-nine states’ mandatory LWOP statutes
as applied to juveniles.17
Some scholars have emphasized the distinctive nature of these cases,
framing Graham, Miller, and Montgomery as about “kids,” and the ways that
they are “different.”18 This Article begins from the contrary premise,
mining the juvenile LWOP cases for clues about the Roberts Court’s
assumptions and internal divisions on questions of what might be called
garden-variety adult punishment—the implicit default against which
juvenile punishment is compared. This Article performs a close reading of
these cases, contextualized in historical perspective, to taxonomize a divide
14
15
16
17
18

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See John F. Stinneford, The Illusory Eighth Amendment, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 437, 440 (2013)
(characterizing the Eighth Amendment as “illusory” in practice).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005).
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 467 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2010).
See, e.g., CARA H. DRINAN, THE WAR ON KIDS: HOW AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE LOST ITS WAY
8 (2018) (construing Miller as establishing that “children are different in the eyes of the law”);
Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933, 957 (2016) (distinguishing the
juvenile LWOP cases from the mainstream of the American law and culture of punishment
because “juvenile crime is a special case”). But see Paul Litton, Bombshell or Babystep? The
Ramifications of Miller v. Alabama for Sentencing Law and Juvenile Crime Policy, 78 MO. L. REV. 1003,
1004 (2013) (recognizing that Miller raises “questions” about the future of “Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence” more generally).
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on the Roberts Court over the “mediating principles,” or purposive
commitments, that the justices bring to bear when interpreting the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause.19 In the juvenile LWOP cases, a slim
majority reads the clause through the lens of what might be called “carceral
proceduralism.”20 From this perspective, imprisonment is generally
legitimate but, at the extremes and as applied to especially vulnerable
groups, the Eighth Amendment should be read to impose some modest and
mostly procedural limits on state power to imprison. The Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause is interpreted as punishment-regulating, at
least at the extremes. The remaining justices read the clause instead
through the lens of what might be called “carceral conservatism.”21 On this
view, imprisonment is a positive good because it incapacitates individuals
deemed risky or violent. Courts, therefore, should avoid interpretations of
the Eighth Amendment that would unduly intrude upon state power to
imprison. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is interpreted as
punishment-facilitating, with the set of punishments that are “cruel and
unusual” assumed to be quite small.
No wing of the Court, then, reads the Eighth Amendment from a
starting perspective of frank recognition of the moral travesty of mass
incarceration—what might be called a perspective of “carceral
skepticism.”22 Such a perspective might counsel reading the Eighth
Amendment as far as possible to minimize the state power to imprison.
Instead of defining the constitutional limits on punishment with reference to
extreme sentences (such as LWOP) as applied to especially vulnerable
groups (such as juveniles), as the jurisprudence does at present, a
jurisprudence oriented around carceral skepticism might instead impose a
heavy burden on the state to justify the need to imprison in every routine
case. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause might be recast as
punishment-minimizing, defining the set of punishments that are “cruel
and unusual” more broadly. Of course, it is aspirational if not fantastical to
imagine that the current Court would endorse such a principle any time
soon, but pondering what the Eighth Amendment might mean in the light
of such a principle is useful as a thought experiment. Doing so highlights
19

20
21
22

Borrowing from Owen Fiss, Reva Siegel defines a “mediating principle” as a mode of interpreting
a particular constitutional provision “purposively to vindicate one particular understanding of the
concept or value the clause expressly guarantees.” Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to
Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1282 n.8
(2011) (citing Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976)).
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Part IV.
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by contrast the limited nature of the Roberts Court’s juvenile LWOP cases
and their capacity to preserve the status quo of mass incarceration. There
may be resources within carceral proceduralism for introducing new
protections on the margins for exceptional categories of adults, but the
juvenile LWOP cases cannot be read to encourage a constitutional attack
on mass incarceration more broadly. As Judge Nancy Gertner has
observed, the Eighth Amendment has proven an inadequate tool for
“deal[ing] with the extraordinary prison terms that we have been imposing
on defendants across this country for the past three decades.”23 The
juvenile LWOP cases do not call that assessment into question.
This Article thus provides a more pessimistic reading of the juvenile
LWOP cases than many juvenile justice scholars, who have generally
received these cases with optimism. Some extol Graham, Miller, and
Montgomery as exemplars of the Supreme Court’s “moral leadership” and
predict that they will launch a “revolution in juvenile justice.”24 Others
have given the decisions a more guarded, but still positive reception, finding
in Graham and Miller “reasons for optimism” about the possibility of a
“fairer” juvenile justice regime.25 If nothing else, the cases have “symbolic
importance,” signaling a new and salutary judicial recognition of “the
relevance to criminal punishment of differences between juvenile and adult
offenders.”26 Eighth Amendment scholars, in contrast, have tended to
emphasize the exceedingly limited nature of the Court’s holdings in Graham,
Miller, and Montgomery,27 noting that the cases in which the Court has
actually invalidated death or LWOP punishments affect “only onethousandth of one percent of all felony convictions.”28
23

24
25
26
27
28

Nancy Gertner, Miller v. Alabama: What It Is, What It May Be, and What It Is Not, 78 MO. L. REV.
1041, 1041–42 (2013); see also Nancy Gertner, On Competence, Legitimacy, and Proportionality, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 1585, 1586–87 (2012) (developing this point at greater length).
DRINAN, supra note 1818, at 7–8.
Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children Are Different”: Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 71, 74, 105 (2013).
Id. at 90.
See generally Litton, supra note 18 (summarizing different views of Miller as “bombshell” or “baby
step”).
Stinneford, supra note 15, at 490. For more optimistic readings, see, for example, William W.
Berry III, Eighth Amendment Presumptions A Constitutional Framework for Curbing Mass Incarceration, 89 S.
CAL. L. REV. 67, 102 (2015) (characterizing Miller as a possible “baby step” toward “ending mass
incarceration”); Robert J. Smith & Zoë Robinson, Constitutional Liberty and the Progression of
Punishment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 413, 415–16, 419 (2017) (suggesting that Graham and other
cases reflect an incremental shift in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence “toward a fundamentally
robust protection” for “the liberty interests of criminal defendants,” in which the Court plays a
more active role “as an independent arbiter of excessive punishment”). As Smith and Robinson
acknowledge, if any such shift is underway it is proceeding extremely gradually; I therefore
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This Article doubles down on this more pessimistic view of the juvenile
LWOP cases by emphasizing not only these cases’ doctrinal and practical
limits but also some troubling implications of the Justices’ rhetoric. For a
dark subtheme pervades this line of cases: they inscribe into constitutional
law an optimistic account of the potential of adolescents, but at the expense
of introducing into the case law an extremely bleak vision of adults. Justice
Kagan’s majority opinion in Miller, for example, relies throughout upon an
essentialized categorical distinction between “adolescents,” plastic and thus
presumptively reformable, and “adults,” fixed and thus potentially
irredeemable.29 Justice Kagan expresses concern not about LWOP as a
punishment, but only about “subjecting a juvenile to the same life-withoutparole sentence applicable to an adult.”30 Although it remains to be seen
whether or how Miller will be extended beyond the juvenile context, Justice
Kagan’s Miller opinion could equally be used to shore up the constitutional
status of LWOP as an acceptable form of punishment, except in very
limited circumstances. If so, that outcome could hinder efforts to roll back
mass imprisonment, for it is the availability (and routine use) of life prison
terms that makes the United States an extreme outlier, calibrating the
entire scale of punishment in this country at a very high baseline.31 While
introducing new procedural limits on the sentencing of children, then, the
lasting significance of the juvenile LWOP cases could be to reaffirm as the
default rule that the Constitution imposes no meaningful limits on mass

29
30
31

interpret their analysis more as an aspirational claim about where they hope the Court will go
than as an empirical description of the Court’s past decisions.
Though acknowledging that the group encompassed by the juvenile LWOP cases is tiny,
Stinneford characterizes the case law as “highly protective” of that group, supra note 15, at 491, a
characterization with which I disagree. Graham and Miller do not actually preclude serving life in
prison for any juvenile, they merely require certain procedural formalities (parole hearings in
Graham—at which parole may be denied—and individualized sentencing in Miller). See Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80, 489 (2012) (holding “that the Eighth Amendment forbids a
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders,” but “not foreclos[ing] a sentencer’s ability to make [the] judgment” that the “harshest
possible penalty” is merited, so long as the sentence is not imposed mandatorily); Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2010) (“A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a
juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must do, however, is give
defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release [i.e., a parole hearing]”).
Miller, 567 U.S. at 471–74.
Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
See Jonathan Simon, How Should We Punish Murder?, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1241, 1246 (2011)
(explaining how the anomalous use of life sentences in the United States serves to “anchor” the
larger “system of over-punishment”); see also Kleinfeld, supra note 18, at 950–58 (characterizing
LWOP as “the paradigmatic example” of imprisonment as banishment, and emphasizing the
difference between American acceptance of LWOP vs. European rejection of LWOP as
exemplary of the divide between the two regions’ “cultures of punishment”).
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imprisonment.
Rather than examples of moral leadership, then, the juvenile LWOP
cases exemplify the Court’s moral uselessness in the face of mass
incarceration.32 In providing a critical reading of the juvenile LWOP
cases—and especially Miller—this Article highlights themes that are latent
in the scholarly discussion of these cases, but that merit further emphasis
and development. A close reading of the opinions themselves, focusing on
the Justices’ rhetoric and situating that rhetoric within historical context,
reveals that a near-majority of the Court that decided the juvenile LWOP
cases would not only permit juvenile LWOP sentences but has no
constitutional qualms about, and may even affirmatively favor, the overall
project of mass incarceration that states have carried out over the past
several decades. This near-majority could soon become a majority,
because of the retirement of Justice Kennedy and his replacement by a
jurist whom commentators predict will prove more consistently
conservative.33 The remaining members of the Roberts Court—who
constituted the slim majorities that decided the juvenile LWOP cases—
express doubts about the “carceral state”34 at its extremes, but broadly
accept the core justifications for lengthy imprisonment for ordinary adults.
Thus, like the carceral conservatives, they broadly accept as constitutional
the status quo of mass incarceration.
These observations raise, in turn, a larger question: Where is the
Constitution in the “carceral state”? Criminal procedure scholars have
grappled with dimensions of this question, of course, but it invites more
32

33

34

See Sharon Dolovich, Canons of Evasion in Constitutional Criminal Law, in THE NEW CRIMINAL
JUSTICE THINKING 111, 113 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) (characterizing
the Supreme Court as having “retreat[ed] from the meaningful application of basic constitutional
values” in the criminal realm).
See Oliver Roeder & Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, How Conservative Is Brett Kavanaugh?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jul. 17, 2018, 6:54 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/howconservative-is-brett-kavanaugh/ (summarizing several scholars’ empirical predictions that
“Kavanaugh is likely to be a very conservative justice”). Of course, Justice Scalia has also been
replaced since the juvenile LWOP cases were decided, and while most commentators describe his
replacement, Neil Gorsuch, as similarly conservative, it remains possible that he will rule in
idiosyncratic ways. See Mark Joseph Stern, The Gorsuch Brief, SLATE (Oct. 11, 2018, 6:29 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/nielsen-preap-aclu-neil-gorsuch-briefs.html
(describing progressive advocates’ view that Gorsuch may be persuadable to rule in their favor on
textualist grounds).
For an explanation of the term “carceral state,” see generally Kelly Lytle Hernández, Kahlil
Gibran Muhammad & Heather Ann Thompson, Introduction: Constructing the Carceral State, 102 J. AM.
HIST. 18 (2015). But see Ashley Rubin & Michelle S. Phelps, Fracturing the Penal State: State Actors and
the Role of Conflict in Penal Change, 21 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 422 (2017) (cautioning against
unreflective uses of the term to imply a unified entity responsible for punishment).
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engagement from scholars and teachers of constitutional law more broadly.
Must and will the “Constitution-in-practice” accommodate mass
incarceration indefinitely? As Jack Balkin has shown, each of the successive
state-building projects of modern United States history—the administrative
and regulatory state, the welfare state, and the surveillance state—initially
posed challenges to constitutional culture and the rule of law, though (for
better or worse) the “Constitution-in-practice” ultimately found ways to
accommodate each of them.35 What, then, about the “carceral state”—the
complex of punitive laws, institutions, practices, and norms that developed
gradually throughout United States history but has accelerated and
metastasized since the 1970s into a phenomenon without historical or
comparative parallel?36 Will a similar trajectory also lead (in this case, most
likely for worse) to permanent constitutional accommodation with this latest
state-building project? On the current Court, only Justice Sotomayor has
forthrightly confronted these questions. In her dissenting opinion in Utah v.
Strieff, a Fourth Amendment case, Justice Sotomayor cited several wellknown books about mass incarceration to support her description of how
“people of color are disproportionate victims” of unconstitutional policing,
and may feel that they are “not . . . citizen[s] of a democracy but the
subject[s] of a carceral state.”37 But notably, no other Justice joined that
section of her dissent.
Superficially, the carceral state may seem to pose fewer conceptual
challenges for constitutional culture than the regulatory or welfare states,
since the Bill of Rights itself provides guidance on questions of bail,
sentencing, and criminal procedure. But the Bill of Rights was drafted and
ratified at a time when prisons were novel and imprisonment was not yet the
default mode of punishment.38
And many other components of
constitutional law and culture, beyond just the criminal procedure provisions
in the Bill of Rights, interlock to make it difficult to challenge mass
incarceration through litigation: the backdrop assumption of a state “police
power,” the norm of judicial deference to democratically elected legislatures,
and the intent requirement for proving racial discrimination.39 It is,
35
36
37
38

39

See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 25 (2008).
Heather Ann Thompson, Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and Transformation
in Postwar American History, 97 J. AM. HIST. 703, 703 (2010).
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
At the founding, fines, whipping, and banishment remained common forms of punishment. By
1810, imprisonment in the new state penitentiaries had become more common. REBECCA M.
MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776–1941 at 32, 38 (2008).
On how legislative deference and other doctrinal moves operate as “canons of evasion” enabling
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therefore, a more difficult question than it may appear whether the
Constitution is up to the task of confronting an apparatus of internal
banishment on the scale that the state and federal governments have
collectively built in recent decades.40 The carceral state is more than the sum
total of individual criminal prosecutions and something closer to Balkin’s
conception of the surveillance state, a “way of governing” whose tentacles
reach into all of the institutions and practices of law and society.41 It is
beyond the scope of this Article to consider every way in which the carceral
state has been “rationalized and accommodated” by the courts, in ways that
are likely to continue and in ways that are best described as “constitutional”
phenomena.42 As Sharon Dolovich sharply observes, “every day, courts
around the country hear cases with facts that would make a layperson’s jaw
drop . . . and yet find no constitutional problem.”43 But the juvenile LWOP
cases present a potent illustration of this larger phenomenon, revealing just
how much punishment the Court is willing to tolerate, and just how far a
state has to go before incurring the Court’s intervention.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I surveys the methodological
models and historical context that inform this Article’s reading of the
juvenile LWOP cases. Part II performs a close reading of Graham, Miller,
and Montgomery to develop this Article’s account of the underlying
commitments that guide the Roberts Court’s approach to punishment
cases. Part III briefly suggests some alternative possibilities that might
emerge if the Court were instead to adopt a “carceral skeptic” lens in
Eighth Amendment cases, drawing on prison abolitionist thought,
comparative constitutional law, and originalist scholarship. This final Part
is brief because it is intended to spark rather than to settle thought. It is
offered in the spirit of imagination. What might a constitutional law of
punishment look like that would question rather than accommodate the
carceral state?

40

41
42

43

courts to avoid meaningful scrutiny of penal practices, see Dolovich, supra note 32. For a classic
analysis of how the intent requirement played out in the realm of drug sentencing, see David A.
Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995).
For state-specific studies, see, for example, RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG:
PRISONS, SURPLUS, AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA (2007); MONA LYNCH,
SUNBELT JUSTICE: ARIZONA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT (2010).
Balkin, supra note 35, at 4; cf. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR
ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007).
This phrase is borrowed from Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional
Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 500–01
(2006) (describing how the courts “rationalized and accommodated” the growth of the
administrative and national security states).
Dolovich, supra note 32, at 140–41.
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I. METHODS AND PREMISES
Constitutional scholars have long recognized that the “Constitution-inpractice” encompasses more than simply the text—and even, perhaps to the
consternation of originalists, more than simply the text as interpreted in light
of its “original meaning”—but also judicially developed “mediating
principles,” “decision rules,” “tiers of scrutiny,” “frameworks,” and so on.44
For this reason, “in the day-to-day practice of constitutional
interpretation . . . the specific words of the text play at most a small role.”45
Constitutional disputes, certainly in the lower courts but even, in many
cases, at the Supreme Court, are more commonly “decided by reference to
‘doctrine’ . . . and to considerations of morality and public policy” than by
textual analysis alone.46 Some scholars normatively endorse this reality of
“common law constitutional interpretation,” while others criticize it (or, in
the case of judges, pretend not to be doing it), but as a descriptive matter, it
is difficult to gainsay David Strauss’s observation that constitutional
doctrine, as developed by lawyers and judges over the generations, is what
gives the Constitution its day-to-day practical meaning.47 “At any point in
time,” in Jack Balkin’s formulation, “there will be a configuration of
institutions, conventions, practices, and doctrines whose contours are
partially disputed,” which together comprise the “constitution-in-practice.”48
A. Mediating Principles
One component of the Constitution-in-practice, especially useful in
taxonomizing how the Supreme Court interprets open-ended constitutional
provisions, are what scholars of the Equal Protection Clause have called
“mediating principles.” A mediating principle is not an explicitly stated
doctrinal rule, but “a judicial gloss” that “‘stand[s] between’ the courts and
the Constitution,” helping to translate broad ideals referenced in the text
44
45
46
47

48

See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 1–7 (2004) (summarizing
scholarship on these “metadoctrinal” features of constitutional law).
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877 (1996).
Id. at 883.
Id. at 934. Strauss’s point is readily confirmed by the observation that introductory law school
courses on constitutional law do not simply assign the text of the Constitution; to understand the
Constitution as it works in practice, lawyers must be familiar with not only the text, but also the
body of doctrine that has grown up around it (whether or not they agree with that doctrine or the
interpretive methods that spawned it).
Jack M. Balkin, The Framework Model and Constitutional Interpretation, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241, 242 (David Dyzenhaus & Malcolm Thorburn
eds., 2016) (emphasis omitted).
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into more detailed real-world meanings.49 It is a mode of interpreting a
particular constitutional provision “purposively,” in order “to vindicate one
particular understanding of the concept or value the clause expressly
guarantees.”50 In a now-familiar distinction, scholarship on the Equal
Protection Clause has long distinguished between “anti-classification” and
“anti-subordination” readings of the constitutional equality guarantee.51
Jurists who understand the clause to instantiate a principle of anticlassification (or “colorblindness”) read the clause to disfavor policymaking
that classifies individuals as members of racial groups, regardless of the
stated reason for the classification.52 This reading best describes the general
thrust of the case law, particularly in recent years.53 Others, although never
a majority of the Court, argue instead that the Equal Protection Clause
instantiates an anti-subordination principle, which permits or, on some
accounts, even requires policymaking aimed at disrupting entrenched social
hierarchies by elevating the social standing and material well-being of
historically subordinated groups.54
From this perspective, racial
classifications are not necessarily disfavored; policymakers may sometimes
classify individuals by race if their reason for doing so is to administer
preferential benefits for historically subordinated groups, but not if their
reason for doing so is to reinforce traditional hierarchies.55
Importantly, these types of implicit mediating principles may divide the
Court even as they remain latent in most cases because they will not
necessarily generate different outcomes in all applications.56 In Brown v.
Board of Education,57 the anti-classification and anti-subordination
approaches would have yielded the same outcome since segregation both
classified individual students by race and, by relegating African-American

49
50
51
52

53
54
55
56
57

Fiss, supra note 19, at 107–08.
Siegel, supra note 19, at 1282 n.8.
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Groups, Politics, and the Equal Protection Clause, 58 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 35, 35 (2003).
Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over
Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1470 (2004) (describing the view that Brown “declare[ed] the
constitutional principle that government may not classify on the basis of race”). The anticlassification principle, as elaborated by Siegel, corresponds to what Fiss originally called “the
antidiscrimination principle.” See Fiss, supra note 19, at 108.
Siegel, supra note 52, at 1473.
Id. at 1472–73 (defining the “antisubordination principle” as the “conviction that it is wrong for the
state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed groups”).
Fiss, supra note 19, at 153–54.
See id. at 170 (“In many situations it will not make a great deal of difference whether the Court
operates under the antidiscrimination principle or the group-disadvantaging one.”).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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children to separate and inferior schools, reinforced a racial hierarchy that
had both social and economic implications.58 It was only the subsequent
decades of contestation over the continuing legacy of Brown that exposed
the divide between the two views, most bitterly in the affirmative action
cases, in which the principles pointed to opposite outcomes.59 Preferential
treatment for historically disadvantaged groups appears wholly illegitimate
on a strong anti-classification view that regards all racial categorization as
equally odious, but perfectly legitimate or even required on a strong antisubordination view.60
Reva Siegel has surfaced in the Court’s more recent jurisprudence a
third principle at work, the “anti-balkanization” norm.61 Particularly
evident in the opinions of “swing justices” Kennedy and O’Connor in
affirmative action cases, the anti-balkanization reading of the Equal
Protection Clause occupies a middle ground between the individualistic,
conservative formalism of the anti-classification principle and the groupbased, redistributive vision of the anti-subordination principle.62 In Justice
Kennedy’s view, as elucidated by Siegel, the Equal Protection Clause
should be read with the purpose in mind of minimizing balkanizing social
divisions.63 Policymaking that takes account of race or other group
categories is permissible in the service of bridging social divides, including
those that derive from the continuing legacy of segregation. But race-based
policymaking is impermissible if the categories are too crudely defined, or if
they are used in ways that are likely to foment resentment and encourage
people to identify themselves primarily as part of subgroups rather than as
part of a larger society.64
It may seem as though this approach is inapposite to the Eighth
Amendment. In contrast to equal protection scholarship, much of which
has focused on distilling and evaluating the “mediating principles” at work
58
59
60

61
62
63
64

See Fiss, supra note 19, at 170–71.
See id. at 171–72; see also Siegel, supra note 52, at 1470.
See Fiss, supra note 19, at 155, 171–72. Interestingly, Fiss’s suggestion that courts might offer
“time-bound” approval for preferential programs for minorities anticipated Justice O’Connor’s
suggestion in the affirmative action cases that after 25 years they may no longer be constitutional
(which is not to say that Justice O’Connor engaged in anti-subordination readings of the Equal
Protection Clause). See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We expect that 25 years
from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest
approved today.”)
See generally Siegel, supra note 19.
See id. at 1300–02 (describing how the anti-balkanization view combines premises from both the
anti-classification and anti-subordination views).
See id. at 1305–08.
See id. at 1300–03.
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in the jurisprudence, scholars often characterize Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence as untethered to any coherent principles.65 For example,
Erwin Chemerinsky describes the constitutional law of punishment as
“markedly inconsistent both in terms of substantive limits and procedural
requirements.”66 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has characterized its
punishment jurisprudence as lacking “a unifying principle.”67 In this
standard account, the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence represents
“a paradigm of improper judicial legislation.”68 Lacking any guiding
principles, the Justices are instead thought to indulge in Eighth Amendment
cases in independent moral and policy judgments, free-floating from any
conception of the constitutional text or the larger commitments that it
embodies. In Justice Scalia’s withering assessment, Eighth Amendment
doctrine shifts with the winds, guided by no principle but the Justices’ own
idiosyncratic assessments of societal “evolution.”69 In Justice Alito’s view,
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has degenerated ever closer to
representing simply “the personal views of five Justices.”70
On the surface, proportionality offers the closest thing to a guiding
principle in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.71 Members of the Court
65

66
67
68

69
70

71

E.g., Berry, supra note 28, at 67, 70 (arguing that Eighth Amendment case law lacks “a set of
broader guiding principles delineating the boundary between acceptable and impermissible
punishments.”); Ian P. Farrell, Strict Scrutiny Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 853,
858 (2013) (describing Eighth Amendment doctrine as “notoriously unclear and inconsistent”);
Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 684 (2005)
(describing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as “ineffectual and incoherent”); Mary Sigler, The
Political Morality of the Eighth Amendment, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 403, 429 (2011) (characterizing
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as inviting “confusion and cynicism”); id. at 415 (arguing that
Eighth Amendment case law “lacks political legitimacy” because the Court typically “fails to
specify the actual grounds of decision,” opening itself up to the criticism that it is simply imposing
policy preferences); Tom Stacy, Cleaning up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 475, 476 (2005) (characterizing Eighth Amendment case law as a “mess”). Such complaints
have a long lineage; for an earlier example, see Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited
Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 838 (1972) (characterizing
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as an “analytical void”).
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2004).
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 436–37 (2008).
Stinneford, supra note 15, at 438; see id. at 442 (suggesting that the Court’s cases reflect the
Justices’ “substantive policy judgment . . . rather than the judgment embodied in the Constitution
itself”); see also Sigler, supra note 65, at 405 & n.16 (collecting sources attributing the Court’s
decisions to the Justices’ “personal policy preferences” or rough assessments of public opinion).
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 737, 742 (2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 509–10 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (characterizing earlier
cases as insisting otherwise, but implying that the Court no longer makes the effort); see also id. at
514 (describing post-Miller case law as “no longer tied to any objective indicia of society’s
standards” and “entirely inward looking”).
Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3104 (2015)
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periodically insist that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
embodies a “proportionality principle,” albeit a “narrow” one.72 Yet, as
many scholars have noted, the Court has vacillated in its willingness to
enforce any meaningful proportionality requirement for criminal
sentencing, particularly outside of the death penalty context.73 Since 1983,
the Court has not invalidated a single adult prison sentence as
disproportionate.74
Instead, in virtually every major modern case
presenting a plausible proportionality challenge, the Court has upheld an
extremely long prison term for a crime of debatable severity. For instance,
in Ewing v. California, the Court affirmed a prison term of twenty-five years
to life (pursuant to California’s since-revised Three Strikes Law) for the
theft of three golf clubs.75 It is difficult to imagine what, if any, sentence
that any modern state would actually impose would run afoul of such a
meager proportionality principle. In these cases, the Court always purports
to leave open the possibility that a punishment might be held
unconstitutionally disproportionate, yet it also always emphasizes that such
cases will be “exceedingly rare.” By way of example, the Court has
suggested that it might be unconstitutional “if a legislature made overtime

72

73

74

75

(observing that Eighth Amendment case law prohibits “punishments grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the offense”).
E.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997–98 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Contra Miller,
567 U.S. 460, 501–04 (2012) (Thomas, J.) (stating that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause “does not contain a ‘proportionality principle.’”); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 985 (Scalia, J.)
(disputing that grossly disproportionate sentences are unconstitutional).
Jackson, supra note 71, at 3104 (noting that “the Court’s willingness actually to scrutinize the
proportionality of sentences has varied over time and contexts”); Tonja Jacobi & Ross Berlin,
Supreme Irrelevance: The Court’s Abdication in Criminal Procedure Jurisprudence, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
2033, 2087–88 (2018) (summarizing the Court’s “startlingly uneven” proportionality
jurisprudence).
Jackson, supra note 71, at 3104 n.44; see also id. at 3185–86 (noting that “the Court’s Eighth
Amendment case law on non-capital sentences for adult offenders is sparse” and “for non-death
sentences of imprisonment the standard of ‘gross disproportionality’ will rarely be met”);
Stinneford, supra note 15, at 484 (characterizing protections against excessive sentencing as
“meaningless” after Harmelin and Ewing). In Solem v. Helm, the Court invalidated an LWOP
sentence, pursuant to a South Dakota recidivist statute, for “uttering a ‘no account’ check for
$100.” 463 U.S. 277, 281 (1983). Subsequently, the Court has taken great pains to limit Solem to
its facts and Justices Scalia and Thomas argued against giving Solem any stare decisis effect. See
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 32 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice Scalia's
view that the proportionality test announced in Solem v. Helm is incapable of judicial application.”)
(internal citation omitted) (citing Solem, 463 U.S. 277).
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14, 18; see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 372–75 (1982) (per curiam)
(upholding forty-year prison sentence for possession with intent to distribute nine ounces of
marijuana); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 264–66 (1980) (upholding life sentence under a
Texas three strikes provision for “felony theft”—specifically, for refusing to return $120 received
as payment for air conditioner repairs that were allegedly not performed).
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parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.”76 In effect, then, the
Court has defined the proportionality principle so minimally that it is “has
no meaning” in practice.77
Because the Justices do not even seem to adhere consistently to their
own explicitly stated overarching principles in Eighth Amendment cases,
the resultant body of doctrine appears multimodal. In John Stinneford’s
analysis, the Court does not apply a single decision rule in Eighth
Amendment cases, but rather toggles between two opposite rules: first, “an
apparently irrebuttable presumption of constitutionality” in cases involving
“imprisonment of adults,” and second, “an apparently irrebuttable
presumption of unconstitutional excessiveness” in certain exceptional
categories such as the death penalty for non-homicide offenses and juvenile
LWOP.78 Yet Stinneford does not suggest that either of these rules has any
principled basis. Rather, he argues that the Court has come to rely on these
“implementation rules” because it has neglected to interpret the meaning of
the constitutional text.79 As a result of this apparent doctrinal incoherency,
scholarship on the Eighth Amendment often takes the form of proposing
unifying principles that the Court should adopt, proceeding from the
premise that the Court’s output thus far has been analytically and
philosophically muddled.80

76
77

78
79
80

Ewing, 538 U.S. at 21 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.11).
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 83 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Chemerinsky, supra
note 66, at 1049–50 (predicting that like Ewing, Andrade would make it “very difficult, if not
impossible, for courts to find any prison sentence to be grossly disproportionate”); Dolovich, supra
note 32, at 128 (arguing that the Court’s cases post-Solem have upheld such draconian sentences
that the case law creates a “presumption by extreme example,” signaling to lower courts that they
should “uphold as constitutional virtually any sentence” (emphasis omitted)). Although such
characterizations are most typically offered of the Court’s sentencing jurisprudence, there are also
arguments that the Court has similarly rendered meaningless the Clause’s protections against
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. See id. at 131–32 (arguing that courts incorrectly deny
the majority of prisoners’ constitutional claims because they exploit doctrinal pathways to evade
“look[ing] too closely at the actual lived experiences” of prisoners); Margo Schlanger, The
Constitutional Law of Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 357, 360 (2018) (arguing that
the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment in conditions-of-confinement cases “has
radically undermined prison officials’ accountability for tragedies behind bars”).
Stinneford, supra note 15, at 442–43.
Id.
John Stinneford argues that the Court has developed “implementation rules” in the Eighth
Amendment context, but he views these rules as illegitimate because they are not grounded in a
properly originalist interpretation of the text. Id. at 440–43. Another possible unifying principle
might be the notion of progress embodied in the “evolving standards of decency” paradigm.
Mary Sigler proposes that the Court’s “evolving standards” jurisprudence is incoherent and
overly deferential to legislative majorities as applied, but nevertheless worth retaining. Sigler,
supra note 65, at 429.
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This Article takes a different tack, using the juvenile LWOP cases to
suggest that it may be possible to distill certain coherent purposive
commitments in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, roughly analogous to
the “mediating principles” familiar from equal protection scholarship. This
Article does not endeavor to develop a comprehensive account of
mediating principles across all of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence or even
necessarily to argue that there are mediating principles in precisely the
same sense that scholars use the term in the equal protection literature.
Rather, the mediating principles literature provides a helpful
methodological model, suggesting a way of reading backwards from the
judicial rhetoric in the juvenile LWOP cases to identify implicit principles
and “model division” on the Court about questions of criminal justice more
generally.81 This Article does not offer a normative endorsement of any of
the principles identified (actually the opposite), nor make any claims about
whether the Justices (or some subset of the Justices) are “correctly”
interpreting the Eighth Amendment, under an originalist or any other
theory of interpretation.82 The project of this Article is mostly descriptive:
to distill from the case law some clues as to the premises and assumptions at
work in the Court’s recent punishment jurisprudence.

81
82

Cf. Siegel, supra note 19, at 1281–82.
There is an extensive debate in the literature about originalism and the Eighth Amendment. See
generally Erin E. Braatz, The Eighth Amendment’s Milieu: Penal Reform in the Late Eighteenth Century, 106
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 405 (2017) (exploring the context of penal reform in postRevolution America and how the founding generation sought to distinguish American criminal
law from practices in European monarchies); Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969) (arguing that the
American framers misinterpreted the English Bill of Rights when crafting the Eighth
Amendment); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Harmelin’s Faulty Originalism, 14 NEV. L.J. 522
(2014) (providing a “point-by-point” originalist critique of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)); Alexander A. Reinert, Reconceptualizing the Eighth
Amendment: Slaves, Prisoners, and “Cruel and Unusual” Punishment, 94 N.C. L. REV. 817, 817 (2016)
(placing the language of the Eighth Amendment in the context of early-American notions on the
“permissible limits on the treatment of slaves”); Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment
Punishments Clause Prohibit Only Punishments that Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
567 (2010) (concluding that the Eighth Amendment bars only punishments that are both cruel
and unusual); Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 81, 81 (2010) (emphasizing
that “the nature and quality of punishment are central to the concept of cruelty”); John F.
Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 441 (2017) [hereinafter Stinneford,
Cruel] (arguing that the primary purpose of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is to
“prevent unjust suffering, not the coarsening of public sensibilities”); John F. Stinneford, The
Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1739 (2008) [hereinafter Stinneford, Unusual] (examining the similarities and differences between
the originalist and “evolving standards” interpretations of the word “unusual”).

560

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:2

Generally, equal protection scholars identify mediating principles by
engaging in close reading of the Supreme Court’s opinions themselves, as
well as constitutional commentary, and seeking to backwards-engineer from
those sources the superstructure of premises and assumptions that appear to
be driving the Justices to their patterns of reasoning and outcomes in
particular cases. Reva Siegel, for example, models in her work a method of
closely reading “recent decisions” and “[a]bstracting from the complex
logic of the case law unfolding in history” in order to “model division on
the Court.”83 This approach does not simply take the Justices at their
word, but it does start from their words and work from there.
Methodologically, this Article takes cues from this approach of closely
reading and abstracting from the internal logic of recent Supreme Court
decisions. This Article therefore does not engage in extensive discussion of
the underlying litigation in the lower courts, the advocates and
organizations involved, and their own choices about how to frame the
issues, although such a project would surely also illuminate much about the
developing trajectory of Eighth Amendment law. Nor does this Article
delve into the growing body of case law applying Graham, Miller, and
Montgomery in the state courts and lower federal courts to new fact patterns.
Rather, this Article’s focus remains upon the Supreme Court.
B. Historical Context
In conducting its close reading of the Supreme Court’s juvenile LWOP
opinions, this Article proceeds from the assumption that the Justices are
influenced by cultural and political discourses of the society of which they
are a part, and therefore that historical scholarship on how that society has
developed over time may help to illuminate the discursive constructs at
work in the Justices’ reasoning.84
83
84

Siegel, supra note 19, at 1281–82.
See G. Edward White, Toward a Historical Understanding of Supreme Court Decision-making, 91 DENVER
U. L. REV. ONLINE 201, 202–03 (2014) (discussing how Supreme Court Justices are “historical
actors whose decisions [are] shaped by the cultural boundaries on thought and discourse of their
time,” and noting that historians are well suited to “document” those cultural influences). See
generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (emphasizing the importance of historical
context in understanding Supreme Court decision-making). However, White suggests that this
kind of historical approach will typically be less helpful for understanding very recent Supreme
Court decisions, because “we are too close to those events and attitudes” to recognize the deep
assumptions of our cultural moment that both we and the justices may share. White, supra, at
203–04, 203 n.8. While acknowledging the need for humility in analyzing recent events that
future historians may come to understand differently, this Article proceeds from the assumption
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Two bodies of historical scholarship offer essential context for
understanding the juvenile LWOP cases. The first is the history of
childhood and youth. This Article reads the Justices’ rhetoric in the light of
historical scholarship on the intellectual, cultural, and political development
of concepts central to the Court’s reasoning—such as the construct of
“adolescence” as a liminal phase in the life course. Much of the scholarly
discussion about the juvenile LWOP cases has proceeded within the
framework of positivist science, assuming that there are certain essential,
biological differences that “actually” distinguish children from adults and
then debating the extent to which such differences should inform the
constitutional law of punishment.85 Without disputing that physiological
development occurs during the human life span, this Article reads the
Court’s rhetoric instead within the context of the history of childhood and
youth, a mode of historical scholarship that investigates how understandings
of that developmental process are socially constructed and have changed
over time, along with beliefs about the legal or institutional significance that
should attach to categories like “childhood” or “adolescence.”86
The second indispensable historical context for reading the juvenile
LWOP cases is the unprecedented buildup of the “carceral state” in the late
twentieth-century United States.87 After the 1960s, the United States
embarked upon, and continues to engage in, a constellation of carceral
practices “defined by comparatively and historically extreme rates of
imprisonment and by the concentration of imprisonment among young,

85

86

87

that historical context can be used to deepen our understanding even of relatively recent Supreme
Court decisions.
For a notable exception, see generally Craig S. Lerner, Originalism and the Common Law Infancy
Defense, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1577 (2018) (engaging with the history of the cultural construction of
“adolescence”). Also, beyond the recent LWOP cases, scholarship on juvenile justice broadly
speaking has long incorporated the insights of the history of childhood and youth. See, e.g., BARRY
C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 17–45 (1999)
(providing an overview of the history of “the social construction of childhood and adolescence”).
The history of childhood and youth is a subdiscipline of history with a wide and variegated
literature, to which I do not attempt to cite comprehensively in this Article. For a classic (and
much-debated) text in the field, see PHILIPPE ARIÈS, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE (Robert Baldick trans., Vintage Books 1962) (1960) (exploring the
concept of childhood as a construct, arguing that children were once seen merely as “small
adults” but over time came to be viewed as occupying a distinctive life stage). For recent
scholarship touching specifically upon the legal dimensions of the history of childhood and youth,
see, for example, HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, & THE ANGLOAMERICAN REVOLUTION IN AUTHORITY (2005) (chronicling how changing understandings of
political consent reshaped the legal status of children).
See Thompson, supra note 36, at 706 (detailing the twentieth-century American history of mass
incarceration).
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African American men living in neighborhoods of concentrated
disadvantage.”88 After fifty years of escalating and expanding use of
imprisonment, the United States is now “the world’s leading jailer.”89
Activists and scholars debate whether to label this phenomenon “mass
incarceration,” “hyperincarceration,” “the new Jim Crow,” or “the prisonindustrial complex,” but the phenomenon itself is now widely appreciated.90
Together the federal and state governments incarcerate 693 of every
100,000 residents, for a total of more than two million prisoners—a rate
and a total that are both much higher than the comparable figures in any
peer country in the world and much higher than the United States’ own
historic levels before the “punitive turn” in United States social policy

beginning in the 1970s.91
Not only does the United States have an incarceration rate “more than
five times higher” than most of its peers, but this same characterization
holds at the state level—there is no United States state that is not extremely
punitive.92 It is true that the Southern and Western states are even more
extremely punitive than the United States norm, but the United States
norm is itself quite extreme, and even purportedly lenient or progressive
states by United States standards appear quite regressive in world
comparison. Massachusetts, for example, the United States’ state with the

88

89
90

91

92

Christopher Wildeman, Mass Incarceration, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES: CRIMINOLOGY,
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/abstract/document/obo-9780195396607/obo9780195396607-0033.xml?rskey=F2p5o1&result=103 (last modified Apr. 24, 2012). On the
harms wrought by mass incarceration upon African-American communities in particular, see
generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004).
Katherine Beckett, Mass Incarceration and Its Discontents, 47 CONTEMP. SOC. 11, 11 (2017).
See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (arguing that discrimination based on criminal status is a colorblind
form of racial discrimination); James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the
New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21 (2012) (critiquing the Jim Crow analogy as having a negative
effect on collective memory); Loïc Wacquant, Class, Race, & Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America,
DŒDALUS, Summer 2010, at 74 (labeling the phenomenon “hyperincarceration”); Robert
Weisberg & Joan Petersilia, The Dangers of Pyrrhic Victories Against Mass Incarceration, DŒDALUS,
Summer 2010, at 124 (arguing that the phrase “mass incarceration” is “melodramatic”); Timothy
Shenk, The Origins of the Carceral State, DISSENT: BOOKED (Aug. 30, 2016),
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/booked-origins-carceral-state-elizabeth-hinton
(discussing the “carceral state” in an interview with Harvard Associate Professor of History and
of African and African American Studies Elizabeth Hinton).
Press Release, Peter Wagner & Alison Walsh, Prison Policy Initiative, States of Incarceration: The
Global Context 2016 (June 16, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2016.html. For a
range of perspectives on this phenomenon, see generally the essays collected in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM IN CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Kevin R. Reitz ed., 2018).
Press Release, supra note 91.
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lowest incarceration rate, nevertheless has an incarceration rate higher than
every European and South American country, and lower only than
Turkmenistan, El Salvador, Cuba, Thailand, Russia, Rwanda, Panama,

and Costa Rica.93
Draconian sentencing laws and practices like LWOP,
while not the sole factor, are a linchpin of mass incarceration: “people
convicted of felonies in the United States are far more likely to be sentenced
to confinement than is the case in other countries and . . . U.S. prison
sentences are extraordinarily long compared to those imposed in other
democracies.”94 Comparing United States sentencing practices to those in
other countries that make much more judicious use of prison, Michael
Tonry concludes: “No meaningful progress will be made in reducing mass
incarceration . . . until sentencing laws and practices are overhauled.”95
The insight that the contemporary United States is exceptionally
punitive is, of course, far from novel. Activists, especially women of color
with loved ones affected by abusive policing and prolonged prison terms,
have made this point for decades.96 Sociologists and political scientists have
long sought to make sense of the American phenomenon of “mass
imprisonment.”97 Legal scholars have provided wide-ranging explorations
of the historical, cultural, doctrinal, and philosophical underpinnings of
93
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Id.
Beckett, supra note 89, at 14 (summarizing MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING FRAGMENTS: PENAL
REFORM IN AMERICA, 1975–2025 (2016)).
TONRY, supra note 88, at 2.
See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 40, at 5–29 (describing 1990s activism by women with loved ones in
the California prison system).
MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (David Garland ed., 2001). For
other examples, see, KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 3–8 (1997) (challenging the view that mass imprisonment
was a straightforward and inevitable response to public concerns about rising crime, and instead
describing a more complex process in which political elites took the lead in framing crime as “the
consequence of insufficient punishment”); TODD R. CLEAR & NATASHA A. FROST, THE
PUNISHMENT IMPERATIVE: THE RISE AND FAILURE OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 16
(2014) (conceptualizing mass incarceration as the result of a “grand social experiment” in
replacing rehabilitative policies with severe punishment); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE
PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2 (2015) (describing how the
carceral state has “begun to metastasize” and distort a wide range of public programs and
institutions); NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON
AMERICA 10 (2014) (arguing that both conservative and liberal politicians advanced
“constructions of black criminality” to justify the widening resort to imprisonment); JEREMY
TRAVIS ET AL., THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 24 (2014) (exploring policies that have contributed to the rise in
mass incarceration); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 4–5 (2006)
(arguing that “the prison boom was a political project that arose partly because of rising crime but
also in response to an upheaval in American race relations in the 1960s and the collapse of urban
labor markets for unskilled men in the 1970s,” and has had counterproductive consequences).
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America’s “harsh justice,” particularly the tendency instantiated in very
lengthy prison terms to write people off as irredeemable,98 and
demonstrated how, across a range of doctrinal contexts, the Supreme Court
has largely failed to regulate the machinery of the “carceral state,” tinkering
with its excesses only at the extremes.99 As Sharon Dolovich observes,
“judicial oversight and review are supposed to discipline . . . the state’s
exercise of its penal power” in theory, and yet in practice American courts
“largely affirm the outputs of our plainly compromised criminal system.”100
At this point, then, American judicial rhetoric about punishment cannot
be read independently of this now widely recognized historical
phenomenon. When the Justices write about punishment, the positions
they take and the words they use must be lined up against this backdrop
reality: the United States is extraordinarily punitive, its dominant form of
punishment is imprisonment, and legislative sentencing choices over the
past forty or fifty years have played a large part in constructing this reality.
Therefore, whenever the Justices debate the merits of deferring to the
legislature to make sentencing decisions, they are not debating the merits of
deferring to legislative choices in the abstract. What they are debating, in
real-world terms, are the merits of deferring to legislative choices to build
and maintain mass incarceration. (Almost by definition, cases reflecting the
opposite legislative choice—which is to say, cases in which individuals are
not sent to prison, or are released from prison—are less likely to generate
Eighth Amendment complaints, but in any event it is only very recently
that states have begun to experiment with meaningful reforms to the status
quo.) And by focusing on the juvenile LWOP cases, this Article seeks to
draw attention to how thoroughly the American predilection for harsh
punishment has permeated the Supreme Court—seeping through the
Justices’ rhetoric even in those opinions that may seem on the surface to
hold out a hope of redemption that is so often missing from American
criminal law.
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See generally ROBERT A. FERGUSON, INFERNO: AN ANATOMY OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT
(2014); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICAN AND EUROPE (2003); Kleinfeld, supra note 18.
See generally Jacobi & Ross, supra note 73.
Dolovich, supra note 32, at 111.
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II. READING THE CASES
Informed by the methods and historical context discussed above, this
Part provides a close reading of the Supreme Court’s opinions in Graham,
Miller, and Montgomery—reading them not only with the grain to determine
their holdings and doctrinal significance, but also against the grain, and as
historical artifacts, in order to surface the deeper assumptions about
punishment lurking within them. Some scholars have expressed cautious
hope that the holdings of the juvenile LWOP cases might be extended to
support more rigorous constitutional review of adult sentencing,101 or even
open the door toward judicial intervention in the crisis of mass
incarceration.102 Yet as elaborated in the remainder of this Part, these cases
may prove more limited than they appear.
A. Carceral Conservatism
This Part’s analysis begins with the conservative dissenting opinions in
Graham, Miller, and Montgomery, for two reasons. First, as a matter of crude
vote-counting, Justice Kennedy, the swing vote in Miller and Montgomery, has
now retired. While it remains to be seen how Justice Kennedy’s
replacement will remake the Court’s jurisprudence in the long run (and, for
that matter, whether or how Scalia’s replacement will alter the balance on
the Court), it seems likely that the future Court will trend in a more
conservative direction on criminal justice issues.103
And thus,
understanding the assumptions and premises of the conservative wing of the
Court may be most relevant to predicting the near-term trajectory of the
case law, even though this wing did not control the outcomes of the juvenile
101
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E.g., Jackson, supra note 71, at 3188 & n.438 (describing it as “uncertain” whether Graham and
Miller “foreshadow a broader willingness to take a harder look at the constitutional proportionality
of noncapital sentences,” including “prison sentences for adults”). For an argument that Miller
should be extended to require individualized sentencing for any LWOP sentence or term-of-years
sentence that is effectively a life sentence, see generally William W. Berry III, The Mandate of
Miller, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327, 327–30 (2014). See also Berry, supra note 28, at 83–85 (arguing
for more Eighth Amendment scrutiny of adult LWOP).
E.g., Berry, supra note 28, at 102 (characterizing Miller as a possible “baby step” toward “ending
mass incarceration”); Smith & Robinson, supra note 28, at 415–19 (suggesting that Graham and
other cases reflect an incremental but decided shift in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence “toward
a fundamentally robust protection” for “the liberty interests of criminal defendants,” in which the
Court plays a more active role “as an independent arbiter of excessive punishment”).
See Daniel Epps, Criminal Procedure in Winter, 51 LOY. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3204125 (predicting that Trump’s election
makes it “unlikely” that the Supreme Court will in the near future extend criminal procedure
doctrine in the ways hoped for by criminal justice reformers).
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LWOP cases. Second and more substantively, this Article’s overall account
will likely make more sense if the conservative wing of the Court is analyzed
first, because the conservative Justices have a less internally conflicted
position about questions of punishment. They begin from a relatively
straightforward view that punishment generally, and imprisonment more
specifically, is a positive good, and therefore should be subject to only
minimal constitutional limits. For the most part, the “swing” and liberal
Justices seem to share this view as a default, as applied to what might be
called ordinary adult punishment; it is only in cases presenting exceptional
circumstances, like the juvenile LWOP cases, that they modestly depart
from it.
This bloc of the Court, consistently including Justices Thomas and Alito
(as well as the departed Scalia), and sometimes including Chief Justice
Roberts, appears animated in Eighth Amendment cases by a vision of
punishment that might be called “carceral conservatism.”104 They have
developed a genre of opinion that blends deterrent and incapacitative
philosophies of punishment with lurid imagery borrowed from the “toughon-crime” politicking of the past fifty years to depict imprisonment as
generally a positive good. When used on the right people (i.e., people who
have revealed themselves as essentially “criminal”), it yields benefits for
society. Thus, the Eighth Amendment should be read with the purpose in
mind of facilitating punishment, minimizing judicial interference not only
with state decisions to imprison people in the first instance but also with
state decisions to keep people in prison who are already there. In the words
of Justice Alito, the fact that the Eighth Amendment constrains judges from
interfering with very long prison terms is not a regrettable feature of the
Constitution that his judicial role consigns him to live with. It is, rather, a
virtue of the Constitution that should be celebrated: it is “with good reason”
that “[t]he Eighth Amendment . . . for the most part . . . leaves questions of
sentencing policy” to the legislature.105
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This term may be analogized to “carceral feminism,” a term sometimes used to denote versions of
feminist politics that endorse incarceration as a solution to gender-based violence. E.g., Alex
Press, #MeToo Must Avoid “Carceral Feminism,” VOX (Feb. 1, 2018, 8:40 AM),
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/2/1/16952744/me-too-larry-nassar-judge-aquilinafeminism (presenting several reasons why police and prisons are ill-equipped to prevent sexual
violence and instead advocating for distributive economic justice for women); see also Aya Gruber,
Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 581 (2009) (criticizing the alliance
between some versions of feminism and the politics of crime control).
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 515 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting).

Dec. 2018]

YOUTH AND PUNISHMENT AT THE ROBERTS COURT

567

In the juvenile LWOP cases, the carceral conservative perspective
emerges most clearly in the dissenting opinions of Justice Alito. In Graham,
Justice Alito filed a separate, short dissent designed specifically to reassure
states that they still retained the authority to impose very long prison
sentences on juveniles. The Graham majority opinion, in Justice Alito’s
reading, does not, in any way, alter a state’s authority to impose “a sentence
to a term of years without the possibility of parole.”106 Justice Alito’s
Graham dissent also quotes and highlights a concession made by the
petitioner at oral argument “that a sentence of as much as 40 years without
the possibility of parole ‘probably’ would be constitutional.”107 The
underlying premise at work here is not only pro-prison but essentially propunishment. For Justice Alito, punishment in the service of protecting
public safety is a core function of states and a function with which the
federal courts interfere at their peril—or rather, at the peril of the people.
Thus, Justice Alito seeks to provide states with a road map for how to
minimize the interference caused by the Graham majority opinion.
For those Justices who begin from the premise that the continued
imprisonment of convicted criminals is generally beneficial, it is prudent to
avoid readings of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause that might
lead, even indirectly, to releasing people from prison. It is partly for this
reason that the Montgomery dissenters disagreed with the holding that the
new rules of juvenile LWOP must be applied retroactively, to people like
Henry Montgomery. The Montgomery majority, Justice Thomas complains
in his dissent, reads the Eighth Amendment in such a way that it would
prevent state courts “from insisting that prisoners remain in prison when
their convictions or sentences are later deemed unconstitutional.”108 This
phrasing is telling. To appreciate its import, it is helpful to re-read the
sentence in more truncated form. The crux of Justice Thomas’s concern is
that the Montgomery majority has disturbed the status quo in which
“prisoners remain in prison.” The fact that these prisoners may have been
convicted or sentenced in violation of what (some) jurists would now
consider constitutional requirements is not a reason to let them out of
prison. The key fact about people like Henry Montgomery is that they are
“prisoners,” and thus “prison” is where they belong.
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Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 124 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 749 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Though readily apparent in the juvenile LWOP cases, carceral
conservatism can also be traced in the Roberts Court’s Eighth Amendment
conditions-of-confinement cases. Consider, for example, the dissenting
opinions of Justices Alito and Scalia in Brown v. Plata, the 2011 California
prison overcrowding case.109 Plata upheld a lower court’s order—based on
hundreds of pages of factual findings and issued only after nineteen years of
litigation—designed to remedy the uncontested finding that California’s
extremely overcrowded prisons constituted an Eighth Amendment
violation, because the overcrowding made it impossible to provide prisoners
with minimally adequate healthcare. At the height of the crisis, it was “an
uncontested fact” that a prisoner was dying needlessly in the California
prison system every seven days.110 The lower court issued what is
statutorily termed a “prisoner release order,” but the order did not actually
require California to release prisoners “in an indiscriminate manner,” nor
necessarily to release current prisoners outright. Rather, it mandated a
gradual reduction of the prison population to more manageable levels,
which could be achieved through prospective sentencing and policy reforms
to reduce the future inflow of new prisoners and thereby bring down the
prison population over time.111
In Justice Alito’s view, the Plata majority dramatically overstepped the
judicial role in approving such an order. Notably, Justice Alito’s Plata
dissent begins by emphasizing the power of states to punish: “The
Constitution does not give federal judges the authority to run state penal
systems. Decisions regarding state prisons have profound public safety and
financial implications, and the States are generally free to make these
decisions as they choose.”112 The dissent then characterizes the Eighth
Amendment as imposing “an important—but limited—restraint” on
punishment.113 States, Justice Alito emphasizes, may punish “as they
choose”—subject only to the very minor caveat that they cannot “depriv[e]
inmates of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’”114 Justice
Alito goes on to predict that “grim” results will follow from the majority’s
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Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 550 (2011) (Scalia, J. dissenting); id. at 565 (Alito, J. dissenting).
Id. at 507–08 (quoting lower court findings of fact).
See id. at 501 (summarizing the lower court order requiring California to reduce the prison
population to 137.5% of design capacity, and noting that “the reduction need not be
accomplished in an indiscriminate manner” but could be achieved through future changes such as
“diversion of low-risk offenders and technical parole violators to community-based programs”).
Id. at 565 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 565 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
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holding.115 Misrepresenting the effect of the order under review (which,
again, did not require immediate or indiscriminate release of large numbers
of prisoners at once, but could be satisfied gradually through prospective
policy changes), and making a bizarre military comparison, Justice Alito
accuses the court below of “order[ing] the premature release of
approximately 46,000 criminals—the equivalent of three Army divisions” (the
italics are Justice Alito’s).116 The majority, in Justice Alito’s view, is
“gambling with the safety of the people of California” and its disregard of
public safety will likely generate “a grim roster of victims.”117 The implicit
premise of Justice Alito’s dissent, then, is that mass imprisonment promotes
public safety. Therefore, any interference with a state’s institutions of mass
imprisonment poses a risk to public safety. Formally, Justice Alito pegs his
analysis to questions of statutory interpretation and disputes with the
district court’s factual findings, but the emotion bubbling through his
rhetoric makes clear that he is not merely quibbling about statutory text or
findings of fact.118
Justice Scalia’s Plata dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, offers another
illustration of carceral conservatism. Scalia begins by decrying the lower
court order as “perhaps the most radical injunction issued by a court in our
Nation’s history,” and the Supreme Court’s majority opinion affirming that
order as “outrageous” and “absurd,” a total abrogation of the “power of a
federal judge” that “takes the federal courts wildly beyond their institutional
capacity.”119 But the remainder of the opinion expresses more visceral
worries than simply an abstract view about the institutional division of
labor. The remainder of Justice Scalia’s Plata dissent is replete with
gratuitous asides betraying a generalized fear of “prisoners,” reflecting the
carceral conservative assumption that imprisoning the dangerous is a
positive good, and thus a practice with which the Eighth Amendment
should not be read to interfere. At one point, Justice Scalia predicts that
the order will return to California’s streets “fine physical specimens who
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Id. at 581.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 580–81.
Justice Alito’s prediction of “grim” results echoed Justice Blackmun’s dissent many years earlier in
the Pentagon Papers Case, which raised the specter of dead soldiers. Id. at 581; N.Y. Times Co. v.
United States (Pentagon Papers Case), 403 U.S. 713, 762–63 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In
both cases, it is perhaps worth noting that the predicted effects do not seem to have occurred, but
the Justices’ point in both cases that the majority had intolerably increased the risk that such
effects might occur is not readily susceptible to empirical disproof.
Plata, 563 U.S. at 550 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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have developed intimidating muscles pumping iron in the prison gym.”120
In addition to the dehumanizing language, this line also betrays Justice
Scalia’s inattention to the factual record in the very case he was deciding.
California’s prisons had long been so overcrowded that they no longer had
gyms. The gyms had been converted to makeshift dormitories, and were
filled with triple bunk beds.121
Between Justice Scalia’s conjuring of “fine physical specimens” with
“intimidating muscles” roaming the streets and Justice Alito’s specter of
“Army divisions” committing coordinated mayhem throughout California,
the clear message of the Plata dissents is that some people are irreparably
and inherently dangerous, prison is the place for them, and the courts
under the guise of the Eighth Amendment ought not interfere with their
continued confinement. The carceral conservative Justices’ juvenile LWOP
opinions are similarly replete with essentializing and descriptors of the
individuals involved. Justice Scalia’s Montgomery dissent repeatedly positions
Montgomery’s location in prison as essential to his identity as a person,
denominating Montgomery as “a 69-year-old Louisiana prisoner” and an
“inmate.”122 Elsewhere Scalia refers to Montgomery as “a 17-year-old who
murdered an innocent sheriff’s deputy,” conflating his core essence as a
person with his past crime.123
The lens of carceral conservatism can help to explain the dissenters’
intense affront in the juvenile LWOP cases about what might seem to be a
relatively minor doctrinal adjustment. Although the conservative Justices
exaggerated the effects of Plata, they were right that it did involve a
“prisoner release order.” In contrast, none of the Court’s decisions in

120
121

122

123

Id. at 554.
See Stephen Yair Liebb & Héctor Oropeza, Opinion, The Supreme Court Got It Right on Prison
Overcrowding in California, FOX NEWS (June 10, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/
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“inmate” is specifically experienced by many people in prison as dehumanizing. Blair Hickman,
Inmate. Prisoner. Other. Discussed, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 3, 2015, 7:15 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/03/inmate-prisoner-other-discussed.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Graham, Miller, and Montgomery required the states to actually release
anyone, not even the named petitioners—all three of whom remain, as of
this writing, in prison.124 At first glance, it is puzzling why such limited
holdings would generate either celebration or worry. But the dissenting
Justices’ anger becomes more comprehensible if one understands them to
be reading the Eighth Amendment from the standpoint of carceral
conservatism, from the operating assumption that mass imprisonment as
practiced in the United States today is a positive good. Any judicial
chipping away at the states’ prerogative to punish, however seemingly
marginal, thus represents a grievous intrusion upon the capacity of states to
protect public safety. In Scalia’s view, “the Constitution does not require
States to revise punishments that were lawful when they were imposed.”125
What this means, translated into more concrete terms, is that the
Constitution does not require Louisiana to contemplate the possibility of
ever letting Henry Montgomery out of prison. To hold otherwise, in
Scalia’s words, would be “to upset” Louisiana’s scheme of punishment.126
Thus far, this Article has suggested that the dissenting Justices in the
juvenile LWOP cases read the Eighth Amendment through the lens of what
might be termed carceral conservatism—the principle that mass
imprisonment is generally a positive good and thus, when possible, the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause should not be read to disturb it unduly.
The strongest counterargument to this account is what might be the Justices’
own objection: that their dissents are motivated not by their personal
endorsement of any particular legislative choice, only by their commitment
to structural principles like federalism and separation of powers, and/or to
interpretive methods like originalism. But this Article’s account is not
incompatible with accepting at face value the conservative Justices’
commitments to these transsubstantive structural and interpretive principles.
Deference toward state legislatures, for example, is certainly part of the mix
in the juvenile LWOP dissents, and might even suffice to account for the
raw vote counts in these cases as to outcomes.127 But the dissenting Justices’
rhetorical choices imply that, in Eighth Amendment cases, their decisionmaking, however informed by transsubstantive interpretive commitments,
also finds confirmation in a substantive, purposive commitment to insulate
from judicial interference state decisions to punish.
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DRINAN, supra note 18, at 130–31.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 742.
See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 87 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (describing Eighth
Amendment case law as “emphasiz[ing] the primacy of the legislature in setting sentences”).
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On this point, it is illuminating to juxtapose the conservative Justices’
rhetoric in the juvenile LWOP cases with their rhetoric in other doctrinal
contexts. The American constitutional tradition provides jurists with a
repertoire of stock phrases for signaling that they disagree with a legislative
choice on the merits but feel duty-bound not to disturb that choice because
of the constraints of the judicial role. Famously, in Griswold v. Connecticut,
Justice Potter Stewart characterized Connecticut’s contraceptive ban as
“uncommonly silly,” even “asinine,” but nevertheless, in his view,
constitutional.128 In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Thomas recycled this same
language to describe the Texas sodomy ban, and stated that if he were a
Texas legislator he “would vote to repeal it,” even as he expressed the view
that as a judge he felt “duty”-bound to uphold it.129
More recently, every one of the dissenting Justices in the LWOP cases
has provided, in Obergefell v. Hodges—the same-sex marriage case—an
example of what it looks like when he is dissenting (or wishes to appear to
be dissenting) purely for federalism or separation-of-powers reasons. In
Obergefell the identical line-up of dissenters insisted upon the importance of
judicial deference to legislative decision-making, even as they each
professed to be agnostic about, or even opposed to, the substance of the
legislative decisions in question. Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that
there are “strong arguments” in favor of allowing same-sex marriage,
“rooted in social policy and considerations of fairness.”130 Justice Scalia
professed that the substantive law of marriage was “not of immense
personal importance” to him; what concerned him was solely the majority’s
“hubris” in overriding the states.131 Justice Thomas claimed that he
personally was entirely agnostic about the value of marriage, observing that
“[p]eople may choose to marry or not to marry” and opining that those
“who choose not to marry” are no better or worse than anyone else.132
And finally, Justice Alito criticized the Obergefell majority for choking off
democratic deliberation about same-sex marriage by reading into the
Constitution a modern, consent-based understanding of marriage,
foreclosing the ability of states to retain a marriage regime based upon a
“traditional,” gender-based understanding. Justice Alito did not focus his
criticism upon the substance of the modern understanding of marriage, but
rather upon the Court’s arrogation of authority to settle the legislative
128
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Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2626, 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2639 n.8 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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debate between the two.133
The juvenile LWOP dissents do not convey the same affect of agnostic
detachment present in the Obergefell dissents. To the contrary, a sense of
pique pervades the dissenting opinions in all three of the LWOP cases, a
kind of verbal head-shaking at the majority’s perceived naiveté. Justice
Thomas’s Graham dissent accuses the majority of undermining the
“integrity” of the “criminal justice system”—that is, not the institutional
integrity of the judiciary, as in Obergefell, but the integrity of the substantive
field of law being regulated.134 Consider also Justice Thomas’s summary of
why states might find LWOP to serve valid penological goals. Even the
majority, Justice Thomas notes, “acknowledges” that juvenile LWOP has
some deterrent and incapacitative effect, yet for some reason the majority
finds those goals “inadequate” (the italics are Justice Thomas’s).135 Justice
Thomas seems to be invoking vicariously the betrayal he imagines that
legislators feel. Throughout their opinions, the dissenting Justices deploy
carefully selected nouns and adjectives to signal normative approval not
simply of legislative sentencing discretion as a structural matter, but of the
legislature’s sentencing choices as applied to these particular cases,
characterizing the individuals involved as “depraved” “murderers” and
“killers.”136 Justice Alito, for example, assesses the titular petitioner in Miller
as having exhibited “brutality and evident depravity.”137 And although he
nevertheless admits to harboring a degree of “sympathy” for Miller, he
emphasizes that the petitioners before the Court represent only “two
(carefully selected) cases” involving “very young defendants,” and hopes
that readers will not “be confused by the particulars” of those two cases.138
In other words, there are other defendants out there for whom Justice Alito
presumably has less or no sympathy.
The impression that the dissenting Justices intend to signal support for
the state legislative choices under review is bolstered by their insertion of
lurid anecdotes, drawn from news reports, of various brutal homicides
committed by teenagers but unrelated to the cases at bar. The dissenting
Justices might be understood to be citing these news stories to provide
examples of the kinds of horrific facts that, perhaps, they felt the cases at
133
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Id. at 2641–42 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 118–19 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 115–16.
See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 494 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing
prisoners serving LWOP for murders they committed before age 18 as “juvenile killers”).
Id. at 513 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.
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bar were lacking. Justice Thomas, in Graham, describes at length an
unrelated crime of unusual “brutality” committed by a sixteen-year-old in
Oklahoma.139 If his goal with the dissent were simply to make a point
about separation of powers and federalism as an abstract matter, this
section with its gruesome details would seem gratuitous. Instead, this
passage operates as a signal of sympathy with states’ choices to sentence
youth who behave this way to extreme prison sentences. Chief Justice
Roberts’s concurrence in the judgment in Graham utilizes the same
rhetorical strategy. Chief Justice Roberts concurred only with the
majority’s judgment that life without parole was a grossly disproportionate
punishment for Graham himself—though emphasizing that he believed
Graham “was dangerous and deserved to be punished,” just not punished
with LWOP.140 But his concurring opinion takes pains to contrast
Graham’s case with a litany of “reprehensible” comparators: a teenager
“who beat and raped an 8-year-old girl before leaving her to die under 197
pounds of rock,” and a group of juveniles “who together . . . gang-raped a
woman and forced her to perform oral sex on her 12-year-old son.”141 If
the dissenting Justices’ strategy (conscious or otherwise) was to use these
examples in order to rally support for harsh punishment among readers,
then they were on the right track: a recent psychological study found that
people primed with a vignette of a particular murder committed by a
teenager were far more likely to endorse LWOP for juveniles than people
surveyed in the abstract about their views on LWOP.142
Justice Alito’s opinions provide similar hints of substantive agreement
with the legislative choices under review. “Determining the length of
imprisonment that is appropriate for a particular offense . . . inevitably
involves a balancing of interests,” he writes in Miller.143 So far, so
deferential. But then, in the next sentence, Justice Alito tips his hand. “If
imprisonment does nothing else, it removes the criminal from the general
population and prevents him from committing additional crimes in the
outside world.”144 Here, then, is a positive endorsement of the value of
prison. If nothing else, prison incapacitates. It removes people who are
essentially “criminals” from society, thereby protecting everyone else from,

139
140
141
142
143
144

Graham, 560 U.S. at 112 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 92 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 93–94.
Nicholas Scurich, Juvenile Murderers and “National Consensus,” 12 HARV. L & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1,
4–6 (2017).
Miller, 567 U.S. at 515 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.
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in Justice Alito’s words, “the risk that these convicted murderers, if released
from custody, will murder again.”145 That practical consequence, really, is
the gravamen of Justice Alito’s complaint with the majority. Justice Alito’s
logic is that marginally regulating the state’s ability to imprison necessarily
has the effect of increasing the likelihood of future murders. As an
empirical matter, the relationship between imprisonment rates and violence
levels is the subject of extensive and highly technical debates among social
scientists.146 The point here is not to reopen this empirical debate, but to
observe that Justice Alito assumes one particular answer to this empirical
question and imports that empirical assumption into his jurisprudence as a
lens through which to view Eighth Amendment cases.
Chief Justice Roberts further signals his views in his Miller dissent.
Unlike in Graham, in which Chief Justice Roberts concurred with the
judgment, in Miller he joined the dissenters, arguing that the Eighth
Amendment does not preclude states from imposing mandatory LWOP for
juveniles who commit homicide. Why did he switch his vote? Because
unlike Graham, which concerned a punishment few states ever imposed,
Miller concerned a punishment that “most states” both permitted and
“frequently impose[d].”147 Like Justice Alito, Chief Justice Roberts assesses
punishment (which is usually to say, in the modern world, imprisonment),
as a positive good, even perhaps a moral duty of the modern state: “A
decent society protects the innocent from violence. A mature society may
determine that this requires removing those guilty of the most heinous
murders from its midst, both as protection for its other members and as a
concrete expression of its standards of decency.”148 Chief Justice Roberts
then notes that “judges . . . have no basis for deciding” otherwise, but this
separation-of-powers aside comes across as an afterthought.149 The
proposition that a “mature society” “may” realize the necessity of
“removing . . . heinous murder[ers] from its midst” leaves open the
possibility that Chief Justice Roberts thinks different “mature societies”
might reasonably reach different determinations on this question (which is
perhaps why he does not vote with the carceral conservatives across the
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147
148
149

Id.
For an introduction to the debate, see Wildeman, supra note 88 (finding that “the majority of the
evidence now suggests . . . that incarceration’s effects on crime are not nearly as large as once
suspected”). See generally STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, DO PRISONS MAKE US
SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM (2009).
Miller, 560 U.S. at 494 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 495.
Id.
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board).150 But what is at least clear is that Chief Justice Roberts considers
the choice to permanently “remov[e]” those convicted of murder an
understandable one. This is of course a political view that many Americans
share, so there is nothing unusual about Chief Justice Roberts expressing
this view, but it is indeed a political view and not simply an institutional
commitment to the proper balance between judges and legislatures.
Justice Thomas’s Graham dissent asserts that “[t]he question of what acts
are ‘deserving’ of what punishments is bound so tightly with questions of
morality and social conditions as to make it, almost by definition, a question
for legislative resolution.”151 In other words, in Justice Thomas’s view, it is
not that contingent arrangements in the United States happen to assign
questions of punishment to legislatures, but that questions of punishment
are on some deeper, essential level inherently legislative by their nature.
One learns something interesting from this sentence. If it were not for the
“almost,” this sentence would read the Eighth Amendment out of the
Constitution entirely. The addition of the “almost” recasts the sentence as
taking the more modest step of almost reading the Eighth Amendment out
of the Constitution. If questions about punishment and desert are “almost”
by definition legislative questions, then what role are courts, applying the
Eighth Amendment, supposed to play? A very minimal one, presumably.
The dissenting Justices’ rhetoric in the juvenile LWOP cases cannot be
divorced from their social and historical context. For the past forty years,
American legislatures have generally exercised their authority to prescribe
criminal sentences in a punitive way. To defend the prerogative of
legislatures against this backdrop is specifically to defend the prerogative of
legislatures to punish harshly. One cannot consider the dissenting Justices
unaware of this fact; they occasionally make express references to this
historical context. Chief Justice Roberts, for example, provides in Miller a
capsule summary of the familiar history in which the states rejected
rehabilitation, beginning in the 1980s, and state-after-state decided “to
reduce or eliminate the possibility of parole, imposing longer sentences in
order to punish criminals and prevent them from committing more
crimes.”152 Thus when he insists elsewhere in the same opinion on “respect
for elected officials” and raises concerns about “invalidat[ing] the laws of
dozens of legislatures,”153 we may reasonably assume that it is not legislative
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Id. (emphasis added).
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 120 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Miller, 560 U.S. at 495 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 498.
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decision-making generically that he is anxious to defend, but the recent
history of legislative decision-making in the service of the build-up of mass
incarceration. Justice Thomas too, in Graham, emphasizes the novelty of
juvenile LWOP as a sentencing practice, describing how “over the past 20
years” states have become more severe in how they punish youth, and have
tended to abolish or limit the use of parole.154 Thus, when Justice Thomas
elsewhere laments that the Miller majority has “[laid] the groundwork for
future incursions on the States’ authority to sentence criminals,”155 it is hard
to read that lament purely as an abstract federalism concern. There would
be no need to express a specific desire to protect, not the states’ authority
generally, but “the states’ authority to sentence criminals,” except to signal
agreement with the states’ determination that “criminals” are the essence of
what prisoners are.156 And it is people who are essentially and incorrigibly
criminals and killers, in the dissenting Justices’ view, whom even the
Court’s quite deferential Eighth Amendment jurisprudence too often
improperly “shield[s]” from due punishment.157
In sum, a near-majority of the Roberts Court—and perhaps soon a
majority—reads the Eighth Amendment from an apparent perspective of
relative equanimity towards, or even approval of, legislative choices to
further and maintain mass incarceration. Understanding the Justices’
carceral conservativism can help to make sense of the seeming limpness of
Eighth Amendment case law. Scholars often characterize the Court’s
minimal efforts at judicial review in this context as overly deferential to
legislatures, or even as abdications of the Court’s responsibility to enforce
the Eighth Amendment.158 But at least on the Roberts Court, the Justices’
own rhetoric suggests that something more than deference to the legislature
is going on. Rather, the Court’s disinterest in meaningful proportionality
review of criminal sentences appears to reflect, at least for several of the
Justices and at least in part, affirmative endorsement of the substance of the
legislative decisions being made, as well as a purposive commitment to
reading the Eighth Amendment so as to facilitate state practices and
institutions of punishment.
154
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Graham, 560 U.S. at 109–10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Miller, 567 U.S. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis added).
Graham, 560 U.S. at 101 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
E.g., Jacobi & Berlin, supra note 73, at 2101 (arguing that the Court has “abdicate[d] its role as the
nation’s supreme constitutional arbiter in sentencing” and instead serves to “rubber stamp”
popular sentiments, no matter how punitive); Stinneford, supra note 15, at 481 (characterizing
Harmelin as reflecting “total deference to the legislature, not merely as to how to implement the
prohibition of excessive punishments, but as to the meaning of excessiveness itself”).
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Another objection to this Article’s account of carceral conservatism
might concede that Justices Roberts and Alito tend to invoke
consequentialist rationales for their votes, but maintain that the carceral
conservative framework misrepresents the views of Justices Thomas and
Scalia, whose real dispute with the majority in these cases derives from their
commitment to originalism, not from any particular views about
punishment. Certainly this is how the Justices themselves characterize the
divide in Eighth Amendment cases, as a divide between the majority’s
mushy “evolving standards” and the conservative dissenters’ fidelity to the
amendment’s original meaning. Justice Thomas’s Miller dissent asserts, for
instance, that most of modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is
inconsistent “with the original understanding of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause” and that Miller has further “compound[ed]” that
inconsistency.159 Justice Alito, in Miller, also considers the Court to have
“long ago abandoned the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment.”160
In fact, the majority in these cases all but concedes this point. Justice
Stevens, in his short Graham concurrence, suggests that perhaps it is true
that “a death sentence for a $50 theft by a 7-year-old” would not have
offended Eighth Amendment standards once, but the standards “have
evolved.”161 And in the view of Justice Stevens, this evolution is admirable.
So too, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion frankly admits that the
“evolving standards” framework is not grounded in originalism, but instead
requires the Court to “look beyond historical conceptions” when applying
the Eighth Amendment.162
For what it is worth, scholars, including some who identify as
originalists, have criticized Justices Scalia and Thomas’s purportedly
originalist readings of the Eighth Amendment.163 But in any event, it is
159
160
161
162
163

Miller, 567 U.S. at 502 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 510 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Graham, 560 U.S. at 85 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 58 (majority opinion).
See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 85, at 1577, 1582–83 (arguing that Justices Scalia and Thomas’s
position relies on an insufficiently nuanced picture of the common law treatment of juvenile
offenders). Lerner posits that it is possible to construct, at least for the sake of argument, a “livingoriginalist” defense of Miller. Id. at 1607. For the broader debate about the original meaning of
the Eighth Amendment, see supra note 82 (collecting sources). In Justice Thomas’s view, prisoners
serving LWOP simply cannot “argue that [their] sentences would have been among the ‘modes
or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of
Rights was adopted.’” Miller, 567 U.S. at 503 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Graham, 560
U.S. at 106 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). Since “14-year-olds were subject to” adult punishments
in 1791, at a time when “mandatory death sentences were common,” it must be “implausible,” in
Justice Thomas’s view, “that a 14-year-old’s mandatory prison sentence—of any length, with or
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both beyond the scope of this Article and unnecessary to this Article’s
claims to adjudicate between the many competing originalist accounts of
the Eighth Amendment. There is no necessary inconsistency between
accepting the Justices’ own claims that they are offering what they believe
to be the best originalist reading of the Eighth Amendment and this
Article’s argument that they find confirmation for their doctrinal
conclusions in how they comport with some larger purposive
commitment—in the same way that equal protection scholarship can
describe originalist jurists as adhering to the principle of anti-classification,
even if the Justices might explain that they believe such a principle
comports with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Carceral Proceduralism
The consistent majority voting bloc, across all three of the juvenile
LWOP cases, consists of Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan (Chief Justice Roberts voted with the majority in Graham and
without parole—would have been viewed as cruel and unusual.” Id. One premise of Justice
Thomas’s view is that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause only bans certain “modes or
acts” of punishment and that prison terms, of any length, are not among the prohibited modes.
This premise, shared by both Justices Thomas and Scalia, has been questioned by both legal
scholars and historians. The premise derives from Justice Scalia’s account in Harmelin, disputed
by Mannheimer, supra note 82, at 523, 525–26 (reviewing common law history and arguing that
Justice Scalia misconstrued it); Lerner, supra note 85, at 1582 n.27 (discussing other originalist
thought); Reinert, supra note 82, at 823 (arguing that “the jurisprudence of slavery demonstrates
that the words ‘cruel’ and ‘unusual’ did not simply purport to regulate the mode of punishment,
but also called for an inquiry into the excessiveness of punishment”); Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay
Wishingrad, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the
Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 783, 786–92 (1975)
(criticizing this reading of the Eighth Amendment). In addition to the criticisms that other
scholars have leveled, I would also note that a second and perhaps even more doubtful premise of
Justice Thomas’s view is that, as of 1791, the Eighth Amendment was understood to import an
accepted hierarchy of punishments, according to which death was worse than prison terms “of
any length, with or without parole.” See Miller, 567 U.S. at 503 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Thus, if death would be permitted for a certain type of offender in 1791, then applying the
original understanding would require holding that LWOP must be permitted for that type of
offender today. In fact, the majority in the juvenile LWOP cases seems to share this premise,
which is why they do not describe their interpretations as originalist. But prison was not yet
widely used in 1791, and there was no parole until the twentieth century, much less any concept
of “life without parole.” See MCLENNAN, supra note 38, at 32, 38 (noting that imprisonment did
not become common in states until 1810). Since LWOP is essentially still a death sentence, but a
much more protracted one, it is at best unclear how it should be squared with the original
meaning of “punishment.” The meanings of life and death themselves were, of course, quite
different in eighteenth-century understandings than they are today. The premise that LWOP can
be transhistorically calibrated as milder than death might be arguable, but the argument would
require far more development than Justice Thomas gives it in the LWOP cases to be persuasive.
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Montgomery, but not in Miller, for reasons that align him more closely with
the dissenters’ carceral conservatism overall).164 In each case, the dissenting
Justices accused this majority of conflating their own policy preferences
with constitutional requirements, overriding the proper bounds of the
judicial role and infringing upon the prerogative of state legislatures with no
principled basis. But in fact, an identifiable mediating principle is at work
in these cases—and moreover, a principle that overlaps with the dissenters’
carceral conservatism to a surprising degree. This principle might be
termed “carceral proceduralism.”
A close reading of the majority opinions in the juvenile LWOP cases
yields the conclusion that for the most part, the Justices in the majority
share the dissenters’ constitutional equanimity about prolonged
imprisonment, certainly as to adult offenders in ordinary cases.165 They
agree, or at least claim to agree, with the conservative dissenters that some
people are incorrigible, and states may conclude that they deserve to be
“condemned to die in prison.”166 “Retribution is a legitimate reason to
punish,” explains Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Graham, and
“[s]ociety is entitled to impose severe sanctions” on those who commit
crimes.167
Incapacitation is not only a “legitimate” reason for
imprisonment but also “an important goal”—and even in some cases, a
goal “sufficient to justify life without parole.”168 Those who commit
grievous offenses may “deserve[ ] to be separated from society for some
time.”169 Actually, if there is any conventional philosophy of punishment
that this bloc regards skeptically, it is only rehabilitation—a surprising
sentiment to encounter in a line of cases ostensibly about the meliorative
potential of youth. Rehabilitation, Kennedy suggests, “is imprecise” as a
concept and debatable as a policy goal.170

164
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166
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170

Justice Stevens joined the majority in Graham but retired soon thereafter; I would generally
include him in this bloc, although his Graham concurrence evinces a deeper commitment to the
more openly moralistic version of “evolving standards of decency” that the rest of the Court has
moved away from. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 85 (Stevens, J., concurring) (reading the Eighth
Amendment to embody a “moral commitment” to engage in a continuous process of updating its
meaning).
This is not to say that the individual Justices necessarily endorse mass incarceration as a policy
matter; some of them probably do not.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
Graham, 560 U.S. at 71 (majority opinion).
Id. at 72.
Id. at 73.
Id.
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The only difference is that the majority appends some procedural
asterisks to its endorsements of carceral punishment.171 Although the Court
often characterizes these procedural caveats as grounded in the
proportionality principle,172 proportionality is a misnomer for the principle
actually being applied in these cases. At least, the term proportionality
should not be taken too literally. The Court is not encouraging case-bycase balancing of individual sentences against individual crimes. Rather,
proportionality operates in the juvenile LWOP cases as a term of art,
signifying a categorical determination that certain special groups cannot (or
ordinarily should not) be sentenced to certain very extreme punishments.
Youth defines the boundaries of one such group, and with respect to
LWOP, it may be the only such group (how far Miller will be extended to
other groups remains to be seen). Central to the majority opinions in
Graham and Miller is an essentialized distinction between youth and adults,
and it is that distinction which, at least in these cases, provides the primary
constitutional limit on very long prison terms. On the adult side of the
divide, there are few if any constitutional limits on punishment-by-prison.
The carceral proceduralist Justices agree with their conservative
colleagues that, for the ordinary offender who has committed some grievous
crime, prison is an understandable response, and they even agree that
LWOP is an understandable response. LWOP “may violate the Eighth
Amendment when imposed on children,” the Miller Court held,173 which is a
carefully worded way of strongly implying, without technically foreclosing
the issue, that LWOP likely does not violate the Eighth Amendment when
imposed on anyone else. There are, the Court implies, legitimate
“penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences” on some
people—just not necessarily “on juvenile offenders.”174 The cases for
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation are weak in the
context of juvenile LWOP, the Court reasons, but that suggests the Court
thinks there is some penological case to be made for adult LWOP.175

171
172

173
174
175

Id. at 71 (“Retribution is a legitimate reason to punish, but . . . .” (emphasis added)).
In the Montgomery Court’s summary: “Protection against disproportionate punishment is the
central substantive guarantee of the Eighth Amendment . . . .” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.
Ct. 718, 732 (2016); see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (holding that mandatory
juvenile LWOP “violate[s] [the] principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment’s ban
on cruel and unusual punishment”).
Miller, 567 U.S. at 473 (emphasis added) (construing Graham, 560 U.S. at 69–70).
Id. at 472; see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 67–68.
See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472–73.
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In several passages in Graham, the majority contemplates and seems to
accept perpetual incarceration as not only constitutionally permissible, but
even understandable for certain people. Consider the following sentence
from Graham: “A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a
juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime.”176 Now, remove the Grahamspecific details: “A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom.”
Or consider this line in Graham’s discussion of penological goals: “To justify
life without parole on the assumption that the juvenile offender forever will
be a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a judgment that the
juvenile is incorrigible. The characteristics of juveniles make that judgment
questionable.”177 Presumably, then, that judgment is not necessarily
questionable for others who lack “the characteristics of juveniles.” And
even as to juveniles, Graham emphasizes that the Eighth Amendment only
prohibits a sentence of LWOP. The Eighth Amendment “does not require
the State [actually] to release” a juvenile sentenced to LWOP “during his
natural life,” only to provide him with parole hearings.178 In other words:
“The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons
convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain
behind bars for life.”179 A fortiori, then, the Eighth Amendment must not
foreclose the possibility that, say, adults convicted of homicide “will remain
behind bars for life.”180 Prison, then, is generally OK—even life in prison.
The Eighth Amendment only “prohibit[s] States from making the
judgment at the outset that [certain] offenders never will be fit to reenter
society.”181 If that judgment is made some other time—but not “at the
outset”—such a determination is potentially permissible.
The majority’s commitment to procedural, rather than substantive,
regulation of extreme forms of incarceration is especially evident in
Montgomery, notwithstanding the Court’s convoluted efforts to construe
Miller as “substantive” for purposes of the retroactivity analysis. Although
retroactivity jurisprudence is complex, the majority’s reasoning in
Montgomery can be boiled down to a simple premise: “no resources
marshaled by a State could preserve a conviction or sentence that the
Constitution deprives the State of power to impose.”182 In the criminal
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

Graham, 560 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added).
Id. at 72–73 (emphasis added).
Id. at 75; see also id. at 82 (holding that “[a] State need not guarantee the offender eventual
release,” only “some realistic opportunity to obtain release”).
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016).
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procedure context, the leading argument against the retroactivity of new
constitutional rules is the state interest in finality. Declaring a rule
retroactive disturbs the finality of long-ago criminal convictions, inviting
prisoners to reopen their long-ago convictions and “forc[ing] the States to
marshal resources” to defend those convictions anew.183 For the Montgomery
majority, this interest is unavailing as to mandatory juvenile LWOP
because mandatory juvenile LWOP is defined by Miller as a constitutional
nullity. But importantly, the component of the mandatory LWOP sentence
that Montgomery identifies as a “constitutional nullity” is its mandatory
nature. It is not the experience of spending life in prison that is
unconstitutional, but lack of an individualized procedure for determining
whether someone will spend life in prison. So long as such an
individualized determination is provided, LWOP may still be imposed:
Montgomery allows for the possibility “that a sentencer might encounter the
rare juvenile offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity that
rehabilitation is impossible and life without parole is justified.”184 And even
for life prisoners who are afforded the opportunity of parole hearings,
Montgomery confirms that it is permissible for a state to deny parole at every
one of those hearings—that is, to determine each time the question arises
that the prisoner has demonstrated “an inability to reform.”185
Unlike the dissenting Justices, the Justices in this bloc confront the
reality and gravity of what an LWOP sentence means. Whereas Chief
Justice Roberts describes LWOP as “of course, far less severe than a death
sentence,”186 Justice Kennedy readily acknowledges that a person sentenced
to LWOP is essentially “condemned to die in prison.”187 In that sense, as
the Court recognized in both Graham and Miller, a sentence of LWOP is not
actually so different from a death sentence. “Imprisoning an offender until
he dies alters the remainder of his life ‘by a forfeiture that is irrevocable,’”
the Court observed in Miller.188 LWOP at least “for juveniles” is “akin to
183
184
185
186
187

188

Id. (alteration in original)
Id. at 733; see also id. at 734 (acknowledging possibility that LWOP “could be a proportionate
sentence” for some juveniles).
Id. at 736.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 89 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736; see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (describing how
petitioners were sentenced to “die in prison”). Advocates and prisoners often refer to LWOP as
“death by another name.” See, e.g., Kenneth E. Hartman, Death by Another Name, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Oct. 23, 2016, 10:00 PM), https://themarshallprojet.org/2016/10/23/death-byanother-name; see also Ross Kleinstuber et al., Into the Abyss: The Unintended Consequences of Death
Penalty Abolition, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 185, 185–89 (2016) (collecting quotations and
references using this formulation).
Miller, 567 U.S. at 474–75 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 69).
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the death penalty.”189 That the majority bloc both recognizes the severity
of LWOP and seems to generally accept the constitutional propriety of
LWOP (subject only to modest procedural constraints, and even then only
for certain limited categories of offenders) is perhaps the best evidence that
they are operating within a doctrinal framework that is broadly accepting of
mass imprisonment.
III. THE PLACE OF YOUTH IN THE POLITICS (AND JURISPRUDENCE) OF
PUNISHMENT
Youth awakes to a new world and understands neither it nor himself. The whole
future of life depends on how the new powers now given suddenly and in profusion
are husbanded and directed. Character and personality are taking form, but
everything is plastic.”
—G. Stanley Hall190
[A] child’s character is not as “well formed” as an adult’s, his traits are “less fixed”
and his actions less likely to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].”
—Miller v. Alabama191
We’re talking about kids who have absolutely no respect for human life and no
sense of the future.
—John J. DiIulio, Jr.192
But what about Milagro Cunningham, a 17-year-old who beat and raped an 8year-old girl before leaving her to die under 197 pounds of rock in a recycling bin
in a remote landfill?
—Graham v. Florida193

Understanding the divide on the Roberts Court as a divide between two
forms of essentially pro-carceral reasoning—carceral conservatism and
carceral proceduralism—casts in a new light the juvenile LWOP cases’
189
190
191
192
193

Id. at 475; see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (noting that LWOP sentences “share some
characteristics with death sentences”).
1 ADOLESCENCE: ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONS TO PHYSIOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY,
SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME, RELIGION AND EDUCATION, at xv (1904).
567 U.S. at 471 (alteration in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD (Nov. 27, 1995, 12:00 AM),
https://www.weeklystandard.com/john-j-dilulio-jr/the-coming-of-the-super-predators.
560 U.S. at 93–94 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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deployment of the concept of “adolescence.” This concept does not
function in the cases as a wedge between a wing of the court that is broadly
deferential toward punitive state policies and a wing of the court that is
actively interventionist into punitive state policies. All of the Justices appear
to agree about the constitutionality of most of the forms of harsh
punishment widely used in the United States today, such as the prolonged
imprisonment of adults. If their views were translated into a Venn
diagram, they would largely overlap. Adolescence represents the sliver of
difference, the outer bound of the diagram at which the carceral
conservatives remain untroubled and the carceral proceduralists insist that
additional procedure should attend a particular punishment.
The most revealing clash between the Miller majority and the various
dissenters concerns the seemingly trivial matter of nouns. Justice Kagan’s
opinion consistently uses the word “children” to describe the adolescents
under discussion; the Justices voting in the majority in the juvenile LWOP
cases tend to describe the defendants as “boys.”194 Writing in dissent, Justice
Alito mocks the majority’s use of the word “child” with square quotes:
“Even a 17½-year-old who sets off a bomb in a crowded mall or guns down
a dozen students and teachers is a ‘child’ . . . .”195 Instead of the word
“children,” Chief Justice Roberts tends to use the word “teenagers”; Justice
Alito prefers more lurid descriptors such as “teenage murderers,” “killers,”
“convicted murderers,” “murderers under the age of 18,” or, at greater
length, “the category of murderers that the Court delicately calls ‘children’
(murderers under the age of 18).”196 “Seventeen-year-olds,” Justice Alito
notes darkly, “commit a significant number of murders every year.”197
That the treatment of young people would divide the Court, at the
margins, is not surprising because the politics of punishment has long been
intertwined with the politics of youth—with societal debates about how best
to educate and discipline young people. The anxieties about urban
disorder that have propelled the growth of the American “carceral state”
since the turn of the century have always been, in large part, anxieties
about young people, whether labeled “juvenile delinquents,” “hoodlums,”
or, later, “superpredators.” Central to the politics of law and order in the
United States has been a persistent concern about the collapse of the family
under modernity—the sense that parents, and especially fathers, no longer
194
195
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See Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 (“[B]oys”); id. at 492 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[O]lder boys”); see also
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (“[A]s a 17-year-old boy.”).
Miller, 567 U.S. at 510 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See id. at 498–99 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 513–15 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 513.
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retained the same authority over their children that they once had.198 In
debates about education but also law, policymakers, lawmakers, law
enforcers, jurists, and ordinary people puzzled over how the state might
discipline youth into responsible adults if families could not be trusted. The
progressive “juvenile justice” movement pushed for the establishment of
separate courts and institutions designed for the special needs of youth.199
In the progressive view, wayward youth were not genuine “criminals” and
could yet be “saved” through treatment.200 For a time, the rehabilitative
impulse also motivated the punishment of adults in the United States to
some extent, especially in some regions, but always with more controversy.
By the 1970s the pendulum swung back and states “got tough.”201 The
resultant matrix of policies, which produced and has maintained the
current landscape of “mass incarceration,” included not only more punitive
criminal law generally but also a rollback of “juvenile justice,” returning
teenagers in many cases back to the ordinary courts and institutions of the
“criminal justice” machinery.202
In the juvenile LWOP cases, the two wings of the Court invoke these
two different discursive legacies of the twentieth-century politics of
punishment: the Progressive Era discourse of adolescence, which argued
that young people remained in characterological development and thus
should enjoy a moratorium on adult responsibilities and punishments (for
both moral and utilitarian reasons—on the theory that youth treated with
mercy might still reform, while youth punished overly harshly might
become permanently stunted by the experience), and the post-World War
II discourse of delinquency, which blended with the actuarial “new
penology” of the late twentieth century to define youth as the most risky
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See ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN: A STUDY IN AMERICAN
CULTURE 133, 143–44 (1929). Of course by the 1960s, texts like the Moynihan Report would
translate this general concern into a specific racialized fear about the purportedly “matriarchal”
black family which lacked a father figure altogether. On the complex political and cultural
debates occasioned by the Moynihan Report, see MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR:
AMERICA’S ENDURING CONFRONTATION WITH POVERTY 59–68 (2d ed. 2013).
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 205–10 (1980).
See, e.g., Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106–07 (1909) (suggesting that
the juvenile offender may be on “the path that leads to criminality” but can still be developed into
a “worthy citizen” and thus should be treated with the aim “not so much to punish as to reform
. . . not to crush but to develop”).
See generally JULILLY KOHLER-HAUSMANN, GETTING TOUGH: WELFARE AND IMPRISONMENT IN
1970S AMERICA (2017) (exploring the history of the decline of rehabilitation and the rise of
deterrent punishment regimes in state prison systems during the 1970s).
See DRINAN, supra note 18, at 133 (reviewing this history).
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and dangerous sector of the population.203 On this latter view, young
people, far from meriting a moratorium on adult responsibility, were
perhaps the group that it was most essential to incapacitate. The
conservative Justices’ dissenting opinions in the juvenile LWOP cases define
adolescence not as the phase in which character is formed but as the
moment when character is revealed. In this view, adolescents are essentially
equivalent to adults—although if anything, more dangerous—both in their
capacity for evil and their relatively fixed personality. Horrific acts, when
committed by teenagers and adults alike, signal unfixable pathologies that
require removal from society.
A. The Significance of Adolescence for Carceral Proceduralism
The majority opinions in the juvenile LWOP cases are constructed
around an essentialized contrast between plastic adolescence and fixed
adulthood. This distinction is present in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the
Court in Graham, but especially pervasive in Justice Kagan’s opinion for the
Court in Miller. After Graham, some commentators expressed hope that the
Court might extend its logic about the extreme severity of LWOP to
provide for more robust judicial review of LWOP sentences more generally,
but Miller appears carefully crafted to foreclose that possibility. Miller
repeatedly emphasizes that it is only the differences between juveniles and
adults that render LWOP sentences suspect when applied to juveniles—
implying that adults can be fully deserving of LWOP sentences: “[T]he
distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing
the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders . . . .”;204 LWOP “reflects ‘an
irrevocable judgment about [an offender’s] value and place in society,’ at
odds with a child’s capacity for change.”;205 “[N]one of what [Graham] said about
children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental
vulnerabilities—is crime-specific.”206 (ergo: what Graham said about children is
children-specific); and “[Y]outh matters in determining the appropriateness of a
lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of parole.”207
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See Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of
Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 452 (1992) (defining the “new penology” in
criminological discourse as “an actuarial language of probabilistic calculations and statistical
distributions applied to populations”).
Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (emphasis added) (construing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) and
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)).
Id. at 473 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 74).
Id. (emphasis added) (construing Graham, 560 U.S. at 69).
Id. (emphasis added) (construing Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–74).
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Miller’s gloss on Graham is carefully crafted to cast no doubt on the
constitutionality of LWOP for adults, emphasizing that in Graham, “juvenile
status precluded a life-without-parole sentence, even though an adult could receive
it for a similar crime.”208 Elsewhere in Miller, Justice Kagan specifies that the
constitutional problem lies not with life-without-parole sentences generally,
but with “subjecting a juvenile to the same life-without-parole sentence
applicable to an adult.”209 The “foundational principle” of Graham, in Justice
Kagan’s restatement, is that states may not punish “juvenile offenders . . . as
though they were not children.”210 It is (only?) “juvenile status” or the
“attributes of youth” that render LWOP suspect.
In the name of saving juveniles from extreme punishment, then, Miller
comes close to endorsing a pernicious implication: the notion that adults can
be written off forever as incorrigible, as incapable of change. The
“‘signature qualities’” of youth, Justice Kagan emphasizes, “are all
‘transient.’”211 It is only because youth is a fleeting and distinctively plastic
phase of life that it is difficult to distinguish between “the juvenile offender
whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”212 By
implication, then, it is not rare for adults’ crimes to reflect irreparable
corruption. It is only because “children are different” that they cannot be
“irrevocably sentenc[ed] . . . to a lifetime in prison.”213 By implication,
then, adults can be irrevocably sentenced. Justice Kagan’s discussion of
Harmelin v. Michigan further nails this point. Justice Kagan takes great pains
to harmonize Miller’s holding, invalidating mandatory LWOP for (juvenile)
homicide, from the holding of Harmelin, which upheld mandatory LWOP
for (adult) cocaine possession. Youth does all of the work of squaring the
two otherwise seemingly inconsistent holdings: “Harmelin had nothing to do
with children . . . . We have by now held on multiple occasions that a
sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so for children.”214 In
other words, there exist two separate and self-contained regimes of
constitutional law of punishment—one for “children” and one for
“adults”—and these two regimes “[have] nothing to do” with each other.215
The dissenters seem to agree with this larger point. Chief Justice Roberts,
208
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Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 479–80 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).
Id. at 480.
Id. at 481.
Id.
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in his Miller dissent, worries that the majority opinion could be extended to
call into question other common practices in juvenile justice, such as the
practice of trying juveniles as adults.216 Tellingly, neither he nor any other
Miller dissenter expresses any worry that Miller will have any spillover effect
on adult sentencing.
Miller, then, could be read to affirm the constitutional status of LWOP
as an acceptable form of punishment, except in very limited circumstances
concerning juvenile offenders. (And even for juveniles, after all, Miller
leaves intact the option to impose LWOP for homicide crimes, it just
cannot be imposed automatically.) Leaving LWOP constitutionally intact is
tantamount to leaving mass imprisonment constitutionally intact, because
LWOP functions in many ways as the anchor for mass incarceration,
calibrating the entire scale of punishment in the United States at an
extremely harsh baseline.217 LWOP is a relatively recent invention, dating
to the 1970s if not later in most states, and remains virtually unknown
outside of the United States.218 The availability of LWOP, along with the
routine use of life prison terms more generally, plays a large role in making
the United States an extreme outlier in international comparison.219 As
Jonathan Simon explains, normalizing extreme sentences for the most
serious crimes has “an inflationary effect on the whole structure of
punishment,” “mak[ing] it far easier to set high sentences for all manner of
less serious offenses.”220 The United States’ anomalous tolerance for life
sentences thus functions as the “anchor of a system of over-punishment”
more generally.221 While introducing narrow limits on the punishment of
children, Miller essentially reaffirmed the constitutionality of that larger
system.
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Id. at 501 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Beckett, supra note 89, at 19 (stating that LWOP “sentences not only contribute to mass
incarceration in a quantitative manner but also raise crucial ethical, humanitarian, and humanrights concerns”). See generally Judith Lichtenberg, Against Life without Parole, 11 WASH. U. JUR.
REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3172899
(arguing that LWOP cannot be justified on philosophical grounds).
See Michelle Miao, Replacing Death with Life? The Rise of LWOP in the Context of Abolitionist Campaign in
the
United
States,
14
NW. U. J.L. & SOC. POL. (forthcoming
2018)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3039994 (finding that LWOP was
promoted as an alternative to the death penalty, although it did not necessarily reduce capital
punishment).
See generally Kleinfeld, supra note 18, at 1034 (finding that many countries in Europe have milder
systems of criminal punishment than the U.S.).
Simon, supra note 31, at 1249.
Id. at 1246.
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It is thus worth reflecting upon the basis for the Court’s essentialized
distinction between youth and adults. The Court cites findings from
neuroscience and developmental psychology to support its analysis, but the
scientific evidence alone cannot explain the totality of the Court’s decisionmaking process.222 After all, and as both the dissenting Justices and legal
scholars have pointed out, the science does not necessarily support such a
stark divide between the moral capacity of adolescents and adults.223
Rather, what seems to motivate the majorities in these cases is the need to
confine in some way the limits on punishment being introduced—the need
to ensure that the rules established in these cases remain exceptional and do
not swallow up the Court’s default equanimity toward mass imprisonment.
The difference between teenagers and adults works well to provide such a
limiting principle, partly because of the availability of scientific evidence to
lend the distinction objective trappings, but also because adolescence is
such an entrenched trope in American discourse (legal and otherwise).
Indeed, the neuroscientific findings cited by the Court—suggesting that
adolescents tend to be more impulsive than adults and also more
susceptible to peer pressure—resonate as true because they comport with
our inherited, cultural common sense about the life course and our deeply
embedded moral scripts of individual personality and responsibility. As
Terry Maroney has written: “Adolescent brain science has become a quick,
culturally salient way to reference those qualities we think are special about
juveniles, such as immaturity, impulsivity, and malleability.”224
Adolescence also connotes instability and uncertainty, which makes it an
apt category to invoke when insisting upon additional procedure; if the
character of an adolescent is presumed to be especially hard to know, then
it makes sense to insist on greater procedural safeguards when evaluating
adolescent character in order to reduce the risk of adjudicative error.
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For a telling indicator of some juvenile justice scholars’ view that neuroscience is at least in part a
rhetorical overlay rather than a determinant of policymaking, see William S. Bush & David S.
Tanenhaus, Introduction, in AGES OF ANXIETY: HISTORICAL AND TRANSNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 3 (William S. Bush & David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2018)
(characterizing “the current obsession with brain science” as an example of “reformers’ rhetorical
choices”); cf. Gertner, supra note 23, at 1042–43 (suggesting that the Court reached outcomes in
Miller and Graham partly because “the arguments were based on science,” which seems more
objective than “norms, policy choices, or values”).
See Lerner, supra note 85, at 1604 (criticizing the Graham majority’s “sweeping statements of
juvenile immaturity” as “problematic,” partly because, “[a]s a descriptive matter, the
categorization of teenagers as amorphously defective, vis-á-vis adults, is doubtful”).
Terry A. Maroney, The Once and Future Juvenile Brain, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN
JUVENILE JUSTICE 189, 203 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2014).
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Adolescence is essentially an invention of the early twentieth century,
when developmental psychology, the study of how individuals grow and
change throughout their lives, was consolidating as an academic
discipline.225 By the 1920s, most educators and psychologists had adopted
the pioneering psychologist G. Stanley Hall’s theory of adolescence as a
“moratorium on adult responsibility,” developed beginning in the 1890s
and first published in a 1904 treatise.226 Applying the nineteenth-century
maxim that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,” Hall posited that each
human life replicated in miniature the evolution of the human race. Babies
were savages, while older children might achieve a level of primitive
maturity. Adolescence was the crucial window in which an individual
would either attain civilization or be forever arrested at some lower stage.
Through the turmoils of puberty, each adolescent relived in microcosm
“some ancient period of storm and stress” for the human race, “when old
moorings were broken and a higher level attained.”227
Hall identified modern adolescence as a period of great promise, both
for individual adolescents and society as a whole, but also great peril. The
collective development of so many individual teenagers held the potential to
raise humanity to ever-new heights of refinement. But for Hall, living
through a historical moment of rapid urbanization and industrialization,
that possibility of progress was threatened by “urbanized hothouse life,”
which “tend[ed] to ripen everything before its time.”228 Modern consumer
culture, in his view, too often lured American youth away from the
strictures of “duty and discipline” into the realm of “temptations,”
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See KENT BAXTER, THE MODERN AGE: TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY AMERICAN CULTURE AND
THE INVENTION OF ADOLESCENCE 3–5 (2008) (arguing that the construct of adolescence
emerged in the early twentieth century “because it fulfilled specific cultural needs” at a time of
rapid modernization); STEVEN MINTZ, THE PRIME OF LIFE: A HISTORY OF MODERN
ADULTHOOD 9–10 (2015) (describing how both old age and adolescence began to be perceived in
new ways during the late nineteenth century). For an account that emphasizes the role of
structural societal changes in the emergence of adolescence (including technology, rising
affluence, and urbanization and other demographic changes), see, generally, Frank A. Fasick, On
the “Invention” of Adolescence, 14 J. EARLY ADOLESCENCE 6 (1994).
Joseph F. Kett, Reflections on the History of Adolescence in America, 8 HIST. FAM. 355, 370–71 (2003); see
also John Demos & Virginia Demos, Adolescence in Historical Perspective, 31 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
632, 635–38 (1969).
HALL, supra note 190, at xiii. For an overview of Hall’s work and influence, see, generally,
BAXTER, supra note 225, at 44–72. Because there is a sizable historical literature on adolescence
alone, including Hall (and Hall is also treated by historians of gender, psychology, and eugenics,
among others), I do not cite comprehensively to that literature here, but refer interested readers to
Baxter’s summary and citations to the literature.
HALL, supra note 190, at xi.
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“precocities,” and “the mad rush for sudden wealth.”229 To counteract
these trends, societal institutions must carefully control the conditions of
adolescence, channeling youthful energy and the will to explore into
disciplined, age-appropriate activities such as sports. Hall attributed
delinquency to social causes; youth misbehaved when their development
was stunted by oppressive institutions. Truants, for example, had given
into “a mania for simply going away,” breaking out of the schoolroom
cages where “pubescent boys and even girls often feel like animals in
captivity.”230
Hall placed such great emphasis on the importance of carefully
structuring laws, institutions, and opportunities around the special needs of
adolescents because he believed that after adolescence, the opportunity to
reform the character would be largely lost. “Criminals,” in his view, were
“much like overgrown children” who had failed to master self-control
during the adolescent window of opportunity; they were “egoistic, foppish,
impulsive, gluttonous, blind to the rights of others.”231 The most important
lesson to learn while growing up, Hall explained, was that “self-control, the
development of which in the individual is the unconscious but perhaps
primary purpose of family, church, state, laws, customs, and most social
institutions.”232 To the extent that individuals within the community
strengthened their “power of self-control,” then society as a whole would
progress. Hall recommended “magnanimity and a large indulgent parental
and pedagogical attitude” toward all young people, “and especially toward
juvenile offenders.”233 Children who were guided compassionately through
the “storm and stress” of adolescence might come out on the other side
having learned the right lessons, but children who were punished overly
harshly might become forever stunted.234 Instead of evolving into
disciplined, orderly adults, children who were not carefully directed by their
parents and teachers risked “evol[ving]” into “habitual” criminals.235
Although Hall’s ideas were more of a synthesis of then-reining ideas
than an original contribution, and soon fell out of favor within academic
psychology, his model of adolescence would remain enormously influential
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Id. at xv.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 339.
Id.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 332.
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upon American understandings of the life course.236 Hall’s conception of
adolescence remade American society in countless lasting ways,
underwriting the development of juvenile courts, the expansion of high
schools, the development of youth activities and sports. While biologists no
longer invoke recapitulation theory, and many of Hall’s specific claims
would sound bizarre or even disturbing to a modern reader (not to mention
his eugenic predilections), his central image of adolescence as a time of
“storm and stress” remains the dominant common-sense understanding of
the teenage years. Adolescents are turbulent, hormonal, not yet fully in
control of their behavior, not yet who they will one day become. As literary
scholar Kent Baxter writes, Hall’s “extremely evocative yet quite evasive
notion of the ‘storm and stress’ of adolescence . . . was an immensely
popular way of depicting this age group, and the anxiety of what might
happen if this tempest got out of control was shared by many
Americans.”237
It is essentially Hall’s vision of adolescence that pervades the Supreme
Court’s opinions in Graham and Miller. In Justice Kagan’s restatement of
this line of cases, “children are constitutionally different from adults for
purposes of sentencing” because of “three significant gaps between juveniles
and adults”: (1) immaturity, which “lead[s] to recklessness, impulsivity, and
heedless risk-taking”; (2) heightened vulnerability to family and peer
pressure (partly due to lack of control over circumstances); and (3)
incomplete characterological formation.238 This third reason is especially
important for understanding what, in the Court’s view, differentiates
adolescents from adults. In Justice Kagan’s summary, “a child’s character
is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s; his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions
less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’”239 Although the
Court has variously invoked “common sense,” “what every parent knows,”
“science,” and “social science” as the sources of authority for this model of
adolescence, and has increasingly dressed up its holdings with references to
neuroscience, the basic outlines are a simplified, common-sense version of
Hall’s model of adolescence, which has long been influential (if not
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See Demos & Demos, supra note 226, at 636 (noting that, while Hall “has been largely forgotten, if
not rejected outright,” the “‘special cult of adolescence’ seems to have lost no strength at all[,]
[a]nd it was Hall, more than anyone else, who fixed it in our imagination”).
BAXTER, supra note 225, at 5. In addition to Hall, Baxter also emphasizes the role of Margaret
Mead’s anthropological studies in influencing the common understanding of adolescence. Id. at
44–71.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70
(2005)).
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
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hegemonic) in American culture.240
The majority’s implied construction of adults as fixed and fully
responsible agents—in contrast to mutable adolescents—also resonates with
deeply entrenched cultural scripts. The invention of adolescence proceeded
in tandem with the discovery of “adulthood,” the state of maturity toward
which adolescents are developing. (Etymologically, adolescence literally
means the process of growing into an adult.)241 The word “adulthood”
dates to the 1860s, but gained prominence as a cultural construct after
World War II, when “adulthood” came to be equated with “maturity,
settling down, and adher[ing] to proscribed gender roles.”242 As youth
became idealized as a time of exploration and freedom, adulthood became
increasingly defined by contrast, as a time of constraint and stability—of
marriage, family, career, and home. If adolescence meant change and
growth, adulthood meant continuity, stability, permanence, “settl[ing]
down.”243 As historian Steven Mintz notes, this conception of adulthood
has always been more mythical than real; there has never been a time
“when a majority of Americans experienced what we might consider the
model life script: a stable marriage and a long-term career working for a
single employer.”244 Since the 1960s, this purported experience of
“traditional adulthood” has become increasingly detached from the actual
experience of adulthood for the majority of Americans (whether these shifts
are blamed on economic inequality, civilizational decline, or simply the
normal processes of cultural change).245 Nevertheless, the conception of
adulthood as a time of fixity, during which a person has a stable household,
career, personality, and character—for better or worse—retains a strong
hold on American culture.
This twentieth-century ideal of adulthood, as a time when one has
attained one’s permanent, fixed state of being, lurks between the lines of the
Supreme Court’s adolescence canon. Beneath every description of
teenagers in Graham and Miller is an implied counter-description of adults.
240
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Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
See BAXTER, supra note 225, at 11 (noting that “the adolescent stage of development is often seen
as the path by which the child becomes an adult,” and the concept adolescence thus denotes “this
process of becoming”).
MINTZ, supra note 225, at xi.
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Id. at ix–x.
Id. at x. For a thoughtful discussion of the legal implications of this shift, see generally Vivian E.
Hamilton, Adulthood in Law and Culture, 91 TUL. L. REV. 55 (2016). For a representative example of
a polemic in the “civilizational decline” vein, see BEN SASSE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN ADULT:
OUR COMING-OF-AGE CRISIS AND HOW TO REBUILD A CULTURE OF SELF RELIANCE (2017).
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Juveniles “have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility,” “leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risktaking”—ergo, adults are (or should be) mature, responsible, careful,
thoughtful, and appropriately risk-averse.246
Juveniles “are more
vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures, including from
their family and peers; they have limited control over their own
environment”—ergo, adults are (or should be) impervious to pressure, selfdirected, and fully in control of their circumstances. “[A] child’s character
is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s; his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions
less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievable depravity’”—ergo, adults have
relatively well formed characters, their traits are largely fixed, and their
actions may well signify that they are irretrievably depraved.247 When
presented in this way, Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in Miller is less an
optimistic account of youth than it is a very dark account of adults. If the
horrible crimes of teenagers can sometimes be false alarms, the horrible
crimes of adults really are signs that they are simply too far gone to merit
inclusion in society. (The Miller dissenters share this same dark view of
adults, except that they think it equally applies to teenagers.)
Scholars have observed the sharp distinction in the way that Eighth
Amendment case law treats juveniles and adults.248 Yet they have generally
interpreted (or criticized) this distinction as an unfortunate inconsistency
within the case law, which provides different constitutional rules for
juveniles and adults, creating a “two-track” Eighth Amendment.249 Or they
have debated the extent to which this distinction corresponds with some
“true” biological reality about teenagers as compared to adults. The twotrack set of rules makes sense if both tracks are understood to flow from the
singular, overarching logic of carceral proceduralism: harsh imprisonment
is generally constitutional, but should be procedurally regulated at the outer
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Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); id. at 490 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Graham
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
Id. at 471 (majority opinion) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
See, e.g., Berry, supra note 28, at 69 (noting that the Court has only recognized “narrow exceptions
to states’ punishment power”); Stinneford, supra note 15, at 473 (“Rules governing adult
imprisonment are driven by a desire to avoid interference with legislative power, while rules
governing death penalty and juvenile life imprisonment cases are driven by a desire to limit
punishment practices the Supreme Court considers pernicious . . . .”).
See, e.g., Stinneford, supra note 15, at 442–43 (describing Eighth Amendment doctrine as reflecting
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“implementation rules”); cf. Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of
Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (2009)
(similarly characterizing the Court’s jurisprudence as proceeding along different tracks, but
identifying the dividing line as between capital and non-capital cases).
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bounds. In Graham, Miller, and Montgomery, the construct of adolescence
provides those bounds, because it introduces procedural uncertainty into
the equation. Adolescents are not yet who they will later be, so unlike with
adults, it is harder to know if they “deserve” punishments like LWOP;
additional procedures are needed to avoid the risk of error.
B. The Danger of Adolescents for Carceral Conservatism
From the perspective of carceral conservatism, imprisonment may
sometimes be the proper response to certain acts thought to signal a person’s
dangerousness or inherently “criminal” nature, regardless of the individual
attributes of the person who committed the acts—such as their age.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that the dissenting Justices largely reject the
constitutional significance of the differences between adolescents and
adults.250 Indeed, it is Justice Thomas, writing in dissent, who most explicitly
recognizes the majority’s debt to G. Stanley Hall. Justice Thomas questions
not only the constitutional status of adolescence but also the concept’s
empirical basis. In his Graham dissent, to support the proposition that most
teenagers can perform “adult-like moral reasoning” and thus should be held
morally accountable in the same way as adults, Justice Thomas cites a poppsychology book entitled The Case Against Adolescence.251 Written by
psychologist Robert Epstein, this book is explicitly framed as a debunking of
G. Stanley Hall. Hall “didn’t create adolescence,” Epstein has written, “but
he certainly reified it, claiming that the teen turmoil he saw at the turn of the
twentieth century was a necessary feature of the teen years.”252 Epstein argues
that Hall’s view of adolescence, based on “faulty” and “discredited”
understandings of biology, should be abandoned and that teenagers should
instead be given “serious doses of real responsibility.” This argument is
encapsulated in the book’s subtitle (not reproduced in the Supreme Court
opinion): Rediscovering the Adult in Every Teen.253 Epstein’s personal website
includes the following endorsement by former speaker of the house Newt

250

251
252
253

Lerner offers a scholarly version of this argument, suggesting that in fact the modern tendency to
insulate adolescents from full moral responsibility is a “self-fulfilling prophecy” that creates
irresponsible teenagers. Like Justice Thomas, Lerner draws partly on Epstein, as well as on the
writings of James Q. Wilson. See Lerner, supra note 85, at 1604 n.172, 1609.
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 118 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing ROBERT EPSTEIN,
THE CASE AGAINST ADOLESCENCE: REDISCOVERING THE ADULT IN EVERY TEEN 171 (2007)).
ROBERT EPSTEIN, TEEN 2.0: SAVING OUR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES FROM THE TORMENT OF
ADOLESCENCE 73 (2010).
EPSTEIN, supra note 251.
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Gingrich: “Adolescence is a social experiment that has failed.”254
Yet if the carceral conservative perspective rejects adolescence as a
social and political project intended to insulate youth from responsibility, it
readily characterizes youth in categorical terms in other ways. For all its
oddities, Hall’s view of adolescence was ultimately optimistic—with the
right institutions and policies in place, he thought that teenagers could lead
the way to a more civilized world255—but of course, Americans have also
historically projected their anxieties and fears about modern life onto
teenagers, from the 1950s wave of political investigations into “juvenile
delinquency” through the “superpredator” panic of the 1990s.256 Perhaps
the most important influence upon the carceral conservative conception of
youth as an especially dangerous group were the racialized anxieties of the
1960s, when policymakers—across the partisan political spectrum,
notably—began to worry about a seemingly endemic “urban crisis.”257 In
truth, African-American children had never enjoyed the same
presumptions of innocence and potential in American culture that defined
childhood and adolescence for other groups.258 But in the postwar decades,
the policy discourse of “crime” became intertwined with anxieties about
urban decline.
Politicians worried about how to manage young,
unemployed, African-American men in the nation’s deindustrializing cities,
who became the public face of the political concept of “crime”—crime as
politicians used the word, not as an individual noun denoting a particular
act of wrongdoing, but as a collective shorthand denoting an amorphous
miasma of violence and disorder that permeated the postwar American
254
255

256

257

258

See Adolescence & Adultness, DREPSTEIN.COM, http://drrobertepstein.com/index.php/adolescence
(last visited Nov. 12, 2018).
See BAXTER, supra note 225, at 62–63 (noting the “rehabilitative quality” in Hall’s theory, which
posits that “if a correct path of development is pursued” during adolescence, then both individual
adolescents and the human race will progress in a beneficial direction).
See generally JAMES GILBERT, A CYCLE OF OUTRAGE: AMERICA’S REACTION TO THE JUVENILE
DELINQUENT IN THE 1950S (1988); DiIulio, supra note 192. Baxter observes that even Hall’s
concept of adolescence was, from its emergence, “closely tied to fears about juvenile
delinquency,” and thus was double-edged, conveying both ideal hopes for young people but also
“connotations of savagery and barbarity.” BAXTER, supra note 225, at 15. Hall worried
extensively about juvenile crime. See id. at 65–66.
See THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN
POSTWAR DETROIT 4 (1996) (summarizing competing explanations over the decades for
“persistent, concentrated, racialized poverty” in deindustrializing inner cities).
See TERA EVA AGYEPONG, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF BLACK CHILDREN: RACE, GENDER, AND
DELINQUENCY IN CHICAGO’S JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, 1899–1945, at 3–6 (2018) (arguing
that the rehabilitative discourse that animated the juvenile courts movement was primarily
intended to benefit poor white and European immigrant children, whereas black children were
not necessarily viewed as innocent and vulnerable in the same way).
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city.259 Beginning with the Johnson Administration’s declaration of “War
on Crime” and continuing through the Nixon and Reagan regimes, the
federal government provided new forms of criminal justice funding and
ideological support that encouraged local and state governments, in turn, to
engage in an unprecedented campaign of surveillance, policing, arrest, and
punishment of urban youth, laying the foundations for the phenomenon of
mass incarceration that continues today.260
Tough-on-crime politics is sometimes framed in legal scholarship as an
understandable if regrettable excess in response to a preceding uptick in
youth crime.261 New historical scholarship, drawing upon research into the
decision-makers’ archives, tends instead to describe both the postwar
punitive turn and the urban disorder to which it responded as produced in
tandem, by distorted patterns of public investment and disinvestment in
troubled communities.262 Policymakers began from the premise that youth,
and especially urban minority youth, constituted dangers to be managed
rather than children with potential to be cultivated. This perspective
resonates with contemporaneous criticisms made by some juvenile justice
scholars even in the midst of the twentieth century’s successive crime
panics. Urban minority youth, in Barry Feld’s description, became defined
as “bad kids” who required punishment, not social welfare programs.263 As
Franklin Zimring wrote with reference to the later panic of the 1990s, but
with resonance for understanding earlier moments of panic as well,
discussions about youth violence have had a tendency to devolve into
259
260
261

262

263

See generally ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE
MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2016).
See generally id. at 1–4 (summarizing this progression).
See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, American Evil: A Response to Kleinfeld on Punishment, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 179,
188 (2018) (“American criminal justice’s harshness began as a response to a real problem: the spike
in crime . . . .”). But see Thompson, supra note 36, at 708–711 (questioning this standard account).
See generally HINTON, supra note 259. For earlier antecedents, see generally KHALIL GIBRAN
MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010). For a careful attempt at the height of the tough-on-crime
1990s to distinguish between perception and reality in the “youth violence epidemic,” see
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 31–48 (1998). Zimring found “no
unitary trend” in youth arrest rates (with reported increases for some categories of offenses
attributable to changing police reporting standards). There was a sharp increase in youth arrests
for homicide between the mid-1980s and early 1990s, but he attributed this not to a new and
uniquely vicious breed of youth, but rather to an increase in gun violence. “Knives are
universally available,” he noted, but “the rate of killings with knives remained stable,” suggesting
that there was some change in the use or availability of guns, not a general uptick in “destructive
intentions.” Id. at 37–38. Without wading into the empirical debate here, I note this study only
to point out that even at the height of the 1990s panic about youth crime the evidentiary basis for
these policy changes was debated.
Feld, supra note 85, at 6–8.
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“fatalistic determinism,” with certain categories of youth all but written off
as inevitably destined for criminality. This type of fatalism could then
become an “excuse for disinvestment in urban youth development,”
“blaming the toddler” today for crimes he may commit tomorrow rather
than investing in his education and environment, and thus making
predictions of delinquency self-fulfilling.264
One consequence of the “War on Crime” paradigm in postwar
American social policy was to roll back many of the juvenile justice reforms
introduced in the Progressive Era under the sway of Hall’s model of
adolescence—such as separate juvenile courts and an emphasis on
rehabilitation over punishment. Waves of punitive lawmaking targeting
youth swept the nation first in the 1970s, although with relatively “modest”
impact in most states, and then again in the 1990s, with more lasting and
wide-reaching effects.265 By the mid-1990s, policymakers described urban,
primarily African-American and Latino teenagers as an essentially
predatory class that could not be reformed, but could only be contained
through prolonged incarceration.266 In the infamous article that introduced
the term “super-predators” to political discourse, John DiIulio confessed his
own fear of teenage boys who had grown up in what he called “moral
poverty,” “surrounded by deviant, delinquent, and criminal adults in
abusive, violence-ridden, fatherless, Godless, and jobless settings,” and who
now had “absolutely no respect for human life.”267 DiIulio held out hope
that future inner-city children could be spared this fate through expanded
public investment in religion. But for those already in their teens, he
lamented, it was already too late: “In deference to public safety, we will
have little choice but to pursue genuine get-tough law-enforcement

264

265
266
267

ZIMRING, supra note 262, at 64; see also id. at 195 (“The largest failure of perspective in the youth
crime panic . . . was a refusal to comprehend the multiple potentials and the contingency of a
generation of young children not yet starting school when the bloodbath predictions were
made.”). For a compassionate study of the feelings of stigma and shame that African-American
and Latino youth experience when even their ordinary day-to-day behaviors are defined as
inherently threatening and potentially criminal, see VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE
LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS (2011). Rios agrees with previous scholars that
criminalization can become a self-fulfilling “destiny,” but also emphasizes youth agency and
resistance, finding that many develop a new political consciousness in response to their treatment;
he argues for policy approaches that seek to encourage, educate, and support young people,
rather than label or punish them. Id. at xv, 158.
ZIMRING, supra note 262, at 4.
See id at 4–6 (collecting quotations and citations from the 1990s in which policymakers used the
term “super-predators” and expressed fears of a “coming storm of violent youth crime”).
DiIulio, supra note 192.
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strategies against the super-predators,” DiIulio concluded.268 “No one in
academia is a bigger fan of incarceration than I am.”269 In this hysterical
discursive milieu, state after state rewrote their criminal and sentencing
laws so that teenagers could be tried “as adults,” in regular criminal court
rather than in specialized juvenile courts, and punished more harshly, often
sent to regular prisons rather than specialized treatment facilities.270 Thus,
the phenomenon of “juvenile LWOP” that the Court, in recent years, has
been asked to evaluate.271
This history is familiar to scholars of juvenile justice, but rehearsing it
here is important because when juxtaposed with the dissenting opinions in
the juvenile LWOP cases, the rhetorical resonances become unmistakable.
Among conservatives in the political branches of government, the “toughon-crime” stance is no longer universal; an alliance of fiscal conservatives,
evangelical Christians, and libertarians now calls for criminal justice reform
to mitigate the fiscal excesses and moral harms of mass incarceration.272
DiIulio himself has since disavowed his “superpredator” writings, and many
other authors of the late-twentieth-century prison boom have since
expressed regrets.273 But on the Roberts Court, 1990s-style carceral
conservatism remains a significant lens for assessing questions of crime and
punishment.

268
269
270

271
272

273

Id.
Id.
See ZIMRING, supra note 262, at xi (describing how in the 1990s, “virtually every state . . . changed
the laws designed to cope with violence by offenders under 18” because of the perception that
youth violence had become “a national emergency”); id. at 11–15 (summarizing the most
common forms of legislation used by states in the 1990s to increase penalties for youth crime). At
the same time, states also made it possible to impose harsher punishments within the juvenile
justice system itself, blurring the distinction between the juvenile and adult criminal courts. See id.
at 14–15; see also FELD, supra note 85, at 3.
See generally DRINAN, supra note 18, at 15–16 (describing how 200,000 youth are charged in adult
court each year and thus become potentially subject to extreme sentences like LWOP).
See, e.g., The Conservative Case for Reform, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://rightoncrime.com/theconservative-case-for-reform/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2018) (noting that “the corrections system
must harness the power of charities, faith-based groups, and communities to reform offenders and
preserve families” while addressing “runaway spending on prisons”).
See Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young “Superpredators,” Bush Aide Has Regrets, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb.
9,
2001),
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/09/us/as-ex-theorist-on-youngsuperpredators-bush-aide-has-regrets.html (“DiIulio . . . conceded today that he wished he had
never become the 1990’s intellectual pillar for putting violent juveniles in prison and condemning
them as ‘superpredators.’”); see also Mark L. Earley & Kathryn Wiley, The New Frontier of Public
Safety, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 343, 343–44 (2011) (expressing regret for support for the
policies that contributed to mass incarceration during one of the author’s tenures as a Virginia
State Senator and Attorney General).
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It is not that the dissenting Justices do not recognize a distinction
between children and adults; rather, they do not consider adolescents who
commit crimes as having any continuing moral claim to the category of childness. In each of the juvenile LWOP cases, the dissenting Justices lampoon
the majority’s insistence on calling the defendants children, deploying scare
quotes and implied judgments of absurdity to hammer home this point.
“The majority,” notes Justice Scalia, “presumably regards any person one
day short of voting age as a ‘child.’”274 The majority, writes Justice Alito
seemingly in a state of shock, thinks that “a 17½-year-old who sets off a
bomb in a crowded mall or guns down a dozen students and teachers is a
‘child.’”275 Child-ness, for Justice Alito, seems not to be a chronological or
biological fact about a person, but rather a qualitative signifier that
connotes something like innocence or value to society.276 By definition,
committing horrific crimes removes one from that category, disproving that
one has the necessary characteristics for the “child” honorific. (In the
majority’s view, in contrast, child-ness is simply a chronological and
biological status, and by definition, when someone still has that status,
heightened procedures should attend any decision to write them off
forever.) Later Justice Alito makes the point again, more explicitly: “The
category of murderers that the Court delicately calls ‘children’ (murderers
under the age of 18) consists overwhelmingly of young men who are fast
approaching the legal age of adulthood.”277 If forced to select a single word
to identify these people, Justice Alito would certainly not choose the word
“child”—in his view, a misleading euphemism. But, it seems, he also would
not choose the word “man,” or “adult,” although he might think those a
slightly better fit. He would choose the word “murderer.”

274
275
276
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Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 744 n.2 (2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 510 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting).
Significantly, Justice Alito’s rhetoric here echoes a long tradition of American discourse in which
black children, notwithstanding their age, were not bestowed with the cultural attributes of
“childhood” status. See, e.g., AGYEPONG, supra note 258, at 13–14 (describing how, in the
Progressive Era, childhood was idealized as a time of innocence and purity, yet black children
were instead portrayed in popular culture as “wild,” “savage-like,” and impervious to physical
pain). Such tropes have proven remarkably durable in the American mind. Today, psychological
studies continue to document that black youth tend to be misperceived as older than they actually
are and viewed as less innocent than their white counterparts of the same age. See, e.g., Phillip
Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526 (2014). I do not mean to suggest that Justice Alito
consciously means to invoke or endorse the view that children differ by race, but rather to
highlight the danger of rhetoric that opens the door for the possibility that some children are not
“really” children in a society with a history of selectively dehumanizing particular groups.
Miller, 567 U.S. at 513.
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C. Where To?
Because they rely so heavily on an essentialized distinction between
youth and adults, the juvenile LWOP cases could have the effect of
entrenching the constitutional status of LWOP and other extreme prison
sentences for adults. Particularly now that Justice Kennedy has retired, it
seems likely that a majority of the Roberts Court in future cases will seek to
limit rather than expand upon Miller. If so, the language in Miller sharply
distinguishing between youth and adults could form the basis for
subsequent decisions cabining the (already limited) holdings of Graham and
Miller to juveniles and juveniles only.
Alternatively, it is theoretically possible that Miller will instead pave the
way towards incremental changes in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as it
applies to adults, constituting an opening wedge towards more robust
constitutional review of criminal sentencing overall. Although Miller is
replete with asides that seem to imply adults are fixed, those asides could be
discarded as dicta in future cases. Justice Kagan might, with apologies to
Justice Cardozo, re-read her Miller opinion “with due contrition” one day,
and notice “all sorts of cracks and crevices and loopholes” that she did not
intend to include.278 Prohibitions on birth control, after all, were first
invalidated in Griswold v. Connecticut as a violation of marital privacy, in an
opinion replete with judicial praise for the institution of marriage.279 In
light of Griswold’s rhetoric, one might have predicted at the time that the
Court would never extend the right to contraception beyond the distinctive
setting of the marital bedroom. And yet, seven years later the Court relied
on Griswold in overturning a contraception ban as applied to unmarried
individuals.280 Moreover, if the Court actually takes neuroscience seriously,
then perhaps changing scientific understandings of young adulthood will
ultimately inform the Court’s analysis. Recent findings in neuroscience
suggest that some brain functions continue developing through the midtwenties and perhaps beyond.281
If so, then perhaps the special

278
279
280
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BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 29–30 (1921).
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (extolling marriage as “sacred”).
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives
to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be
equally impermissible.”); see also Serena Mayeri, Marriage (In)equality and the Historical Legacies of
Feminism, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 126, 135 (2015) (tracing this doctrinal trajectory).
See, e.g., Richard Alleyne, Brain Only Fully ‘Matures’ in Middle Age, Claims Neuroscientist, TELEGRAPH
(Dec. 16, 2010, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/8204782/Brain-onlyfully-matures-in-middle-age-claims-neuroscientist.html (“Brain scans have shown that the prefrontal
cortex . . . continues to change shape in your 30s and 40s.”); Brain Maturity Extends Well Beyond Teen
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considerations that Graham and Miller require for juveniles could be
extended to adults,282 or at least to categories of adult defendants who can,
exploiting the Court’s apparent receptivity to neuroscience, offer evidence
that they suffer from a particular mental illness or addiction that makes
them arguably analogous to adolescents.283
Still, even this possibility of incremental reform is limited in the face of
mass incarceration. Even if the Court might gradually come to define
LWOP as grossly disproportionate for certain types of adults (or for certain
types of crimes), or to impose more individualized procedural requirements
on extremely harsh prison sentences, regulating imprisonment only for
special groups or at its harshest extremes is unlikely to diminish the overall
scale of the carceral state. Few would argue, then, that Graham and Miller
provide resources for a wholesale assault on mass incarceration.284 As John
Stinneford accurately notes, the Eighth Amendment as currently
interpreted by the Court effectively leaves “the vast majority of

282
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Years,
NPR (Oct.
10,
2011,
12:00
PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=141164708 (“[E]merging science about brain development suggests that most
people don’t reach full maturity until the age 25.”); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Richard J. Bonnie &
Laurence Steinberg, Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice
Policy, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 642 (2016) (explaining that development psychologists and
neuroscientists have established that brain development continues “well beyond the age of
majority”); Josh Gupta-Kagan, The Intersection Between Young Adult Sentencing and Mass Incarceration, 2018
WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3138750 (noting
that the prefrontal cortex continues to develop into the early 20s).
For examples of scholarly arguments in favor of extending Miller to adults, see, for example, Berry,
supra note 101, at 347 (noting that “adults are no less human than juveniles are” and that some are
likely to prove “redeemable”); Michael M. O’Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller
to Adults, 78 MO. L. REV. 1087, 1138 (2013) (“[T]he Court’s approach leaves room for lower courts
to begin the process of extending . . . Miller and developing principled limitations on the imposition
of LWOP on adult offenders.”); Smith & Robinson, supra note 28, at 472–74 (arguing that Miller
should be extended to prohibit LWOP for nonviolent drug offenses); cf. Frank O. Bowman, III,
Juvenile Lifers and Judicial Overreach: A Curmudgeonly Meditation on Miller v. Alabama, 78 MO. L. REV.
1015, 1034, 1038 (2013) (arguing—and ultimately lamenting—that the rationale of Miller cannot
logically be cabined to juveniles or LWOP). But see Gertner, supra note 23, at 1043 (expressing
doubt that Miller portends any broader constitutional right to proportional sentencing).
See Gertner, supra note 23, at 1051 & n.84 (suggesting as possible examples those with “a
particular diagnosis of mental impairment” that have “a distinctive fMRI signature,” or addicts
with adolescent-like impulsivity and susceptibility to treatment; but noting that these analogies are
necessarily “imperfect”).
For instance, Smith and Robinson argue for readings of the Eighth Amendment to prohibit LWOP
for juvenile homicide offenders, LWOP for non-violent drug offenses, and the death penalty.
Smith & Robinson, supra note 28, at 469–79. Although I am broadly sympathetic to what I take to
be their policy views on each of these subjects, I am confused about their implication that such
doctrinal shifts would “reinvent” the Eighth Amendment into a robust protection against carceral
excess. The vast majority of prisoners do not fall into any of these categories.
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offenders . . .unprotected,”285 and the juvenile LWOP cases seem unlikely
to change that reality. This lack of protection makes sense, however, when
the jurisprudence is understood as reflecting an underlying principle that
punishment itself is not inherently problematic or suspect, only that it may
require special procedural regulation for particular groups or exceptional
categories. This view requires some default group for whom the Eighth
Amendment imposes no real limits on legislative sentencing determinations
or the length of imprisonment. In Graham and Miller, that default group is
essentially “all adults.” Perhaps that group will become chipped away at
over time, but the majority of adults will presumably continue to fall into it.
IV. IMAGINING CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES
Highlighting the shared constitutional equanimity about mass
imprisonment that unites the majority and dissenting opinions in the
juvenile LWOP cases brings into relief what is missing in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. At present, no member of the Roberts Court
has articulated a reading of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
mediated through a perspective that might be called “carceral skepticism.”
Justice Sotomayor’s expressions of concern about the antidemocratic
tendencies of the “carceral state” in her Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
perhaps come closest. What might it mean to read the Eighth Amendment
in such a way? Offered in the spirit of a thought experiment, this Part
briefly surveys some bodies of thought that might offer conceptual resources
for developing a “carceral skeptical” reading of the Eighth Amendment:
prison abolitionism, comparative constitutional law, and even originalism.
This Part is offered primarily to bring into relief the limits of the current
Court’s position. To be sure, the current Court is unlikely to adopt
anything remotely like a prison abolitionist perspective any time soon. But
the exercise of imagining alternatives can be a helpful way of denaturalizing
the status quo. To draw again upon the equal protection scholarship on
“mediating principles,” the Court’s purposive commitments can change
over time in the course of popular constitutional contestation. In Pamela
Karlan and Sam Issacharoff’s conception, mediating principles do not
solely come from the Court, but are sometimes arrived at “democratically,”
285

Stinneford, supra note 15, at 494. Berry suggests “a constitutional framework for curbing mass
incarceration,” although it is neither clear how many offenders the proposed framework would
help nor how exactly it could be connected to existing jurisprudence. See Berry, supra note 28, at
67, 69–70 (noting that the Supreme Court has failed to establish “broader guiding principles
delineating the boundary between acceptable and impermissible punishments”).
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through “bottom-up political negotiation.”286 When that happens, the
choice for the Court is whether to reject or accept the democratically
developed mediating principle.287 Perhaps the rising tide of activism
against mass incarceration will one day put the Court to that choice.
A. Prison Abolitionism
Prison abolitionism is best understood as an aspirational long-term
vision around which to orient political organizing, not a literal call for the
immediate or indiscriminate shuttering of prisons.288 The prison abolition
movement seeks to imagine, develop, and institute alternative ways of
preventing and responding to violence and interpersonal harm that do not
rely on “punishment and imprisonment.”289 Ultimately, this movement
envisions a future in which “safety and security will not be premised on
violence or the threat of violence” at the hands of the state, but rather upon
“a collective commitment to guaranteeing the survival and care of all
peoples.”290 Grounded in frank recognition of the moral travesty of the
past forty years of mass incarceration, the form of abolition called for by
this movement “may be understood . . . as a gradual project of
decarceration, in which radically different legal and institutional regulatory
forms supplant criminal law enforcement.”291 Despite growing concern
about mass incarceration and abusive policing within the legal academy, as
Allegra McLeod points out, legal scholars and jurists tend to consider
genuinely abolitionist solutions to be “generally unfathomable.”292 Instead,
reform calls tend to target only “the occasional, peripheral excesses of
imprisonment”—which is, of course, an apt description of the juvenile
LWOP cases, which could be read to construct JLWOP as a “peripheral
excess” of an otherwise sound system—rather than taking on “the core

286
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Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 51, at 39.
Id.
See Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1167–68
(2015) (defining prison abolitionism as “an aspirational ethical, institutional, and political
framework that aims to fundamentally reconceptualize security and collective social life, rather
than simply a plan to tear down prison walls”).
What is the PIC? What is Abolition?, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, http://criticalresistance.org/about/
not-so-common-language/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2018); see also McLeod, supra note 288, at 1167–
68 (explaining that the prison abolition movement “focuse[s] on structural reform[s] rather than
individualized criminal targeting” with the end goal of rendering prisons obsolete).
INCITE!-Critical Resistance Statement, INCITE!, https://incite-national.org/incite-criticalresistance-statement/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2018)
McLeod, supra note 288, at 1161.
Id. at 1160.
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operations of criminal law enforcement.”293
In an alternative universe where a prison abolitionist could be
confirmed to the Supreme Court, how might such a jurist read the Eighth
Amendment? When assessing the legitimacy of imprisonment, an
abolitionist jurist would take stock not only of the theoretical justifications
for punishment but also of the actual history of “the dehumanizing nature
and racially subordinating legacy of criminal punishment in American
society.”294 Presumably, she would therefore begin from the premise that
imprisonment has demonstrated itself suspect. As McLeod writes, an
abolitionist ethic would move beyond “simply eliminating incarceration for
nonviolent, nonserious, nonfelony convictions,” which would make little
dent in the prison population, and consider that “[e]ven people convicted
of serious, violent felonies . . . should be able to live their lives outside of
cages.”295 Thus, an abolitionist reading of the Eighth Amendment would
surely reject the premise that anyone can be presumed “incorrigible,” and
thus require some meaningful possibility of eventual release for every
prisoner. (Such a position may seem outlandish from the American
perspective, but it is the norm in Europe.)296 An abolitionist jurist would
also presumably be far more receptive than is the current Court to the
remedy of actually releasing people from prison.297 There may be no
straightforward path from current doctrine to an abolitionist Eighth
Amendment. Yet it is helpful to contrast this vision of constitutional
jurisprudence with our current one, because it illuminates the extent to
which imprisonment even for very long terms is generally presumed
293
294
295
296
297

Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1235.
Id. at 1170; see also GOTTSCHALK, supra note 97, at 2.
See Kleinfeld, supra note 18, at 955 (discussing how European punishment regimes generally
embody the premise that people are not incorrigible).
For an example of a doctrinal argument that sounds in this vein (without characterizing itself as
abolitionist), see generally Alexander A. Reinert, Release as Remedy for Excessive Punishment, 53 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1575 (2012) (arguing for more expansive use of release from prison as a remedy
for constitutional violations, rather than more limited remedies such as resentencing or monetary
damages). In a more reformist vein, see generally Berry, supra note 28 (arguing for more rigorous
Eighth Amendment scrutiny of, inter alia, adult LWOP, mandatory minimum sentences, and
sentences over ten years for non-violent offenses, as a “framework” for “curbing mass
incarceration”). For a new Eighth Amendment framework “grounded in our political morality”,
see Sigler, supra note 65, at 406. Another possibility is suggested by scholarly proposals to
incorporate “strict scrutiny” into Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See Ian P. Farrell, Strict
Scrutiny Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 853, 854 (2013); see also Sherry F. Colb,
Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different from All Other Rights?, 69 NYU L. REV. 781, 784
(1994) (arguing that “the Court should apply strict scrutiny when evaluating criminal laws
imposing imprisonment as a penalty”).
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legitimate by all wings of the court.
B. International Comparisons
Comparative constitutional law also provides resources for imagining an
alternative Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that would provide a more
substantial challenge to mass imprisonment. The use of international
comparisons to inform United States constitutional law is, of course, a
disputed interpretive practice.298 Nevertheless, it bears emphasizing that
the Court’s thin reading of the Eighth Amendment contributes to the
United States’ status as an international outlier when it comes to
punishment.
Surely one factor enabling (though not, of course,
determining) the United States’ extremely punitive approach to
governance, and mass incarceration more specifically, is the absence of
meaningful constitutional review of prison sentences.299
The relative weakness of the Eighth Amendment is somewhat
exceptional, compared to analogous provisions in other legal traditions.
Of course, one of the most exceptional features of the United States
Constitution, as it relates to punishment, is that it does not categorically
prohibit the death penalty. In contrast, the constitutions of virtually all
wealthy industrialized democracies (with the exception of the United States
and Japan) contain express and unequivocal constitutional prohibitions of
capital punishment.300 But the Supreme Court’s refusal to read the Eighth
298
299

300

See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 109, 109–10 (2005).
The causes of the “punitive turn” are the subject of a vast and growing literature spanning
sociology, history, political science, and law. For a comparative account that emphasizes cultural
differences between Europe and the United States, see generally WHITMAN, supra note 98. A
growing historical literature tends to emphasize the postwar politics of race, urban crisis, and
backlash against the New Deal welfare state. See e.g., HINTON, supra note 259; KOHLERHAUSSMAN, supra note 201. Of course, there is something of a chicken-egg quality to my perhaps
heroic attempt in this Article to isolate constitutional doctrine from the other factors driving U.S.
punitiveness. If one accepts the arguments of Michael Klarman and others that the Supreme
Court has functioned historically as a basically majoritarian institution, then perhaps the lack of
constitutional limits was itself a function of the punitive turn in politics. See KLARMAN, supra note
84. But see EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (2013) (emphasizing the contingency of the Court’s near-brush with
abolishing the death penalty in the 1970s).
E.g., 1958 CONST. art. 66-1 (Fr.) (“No one shall be sentenced to death.”); REGERINGSFORMEN [RF]
[CONSTITUTION] 2:4 (Swed.) (“There shall be no capital punishment.”); CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE
[CST] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18 1999, title 2, ch. 1, art. 10, para. 1 (Switz.) (“Every person has a
right to life. The death penalty is prohibited.”). Some countries retain the death penalty for treason
but effectively prohibit capital punishment for ordinary, domestic crime. See, e.g., 1993 CONST. ch.
VIII, art. 140 (Peru) (“The death penalty shall only be applied for in offense of treason in wartime
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Amendment as a meaningful limit on LWOP—outside, thus far, of the
juvenile context—further contributes to the United States’ outlier status. In
Harmelin v. Michigan (1991), a fractured majority of the Court affirmed a
mandatory LWOP sentence for cocaine possession.301 In contrast, the
European Court of Human Rights (the “ECHR”) has outlawed LWOP
sentences altogether as a violation of the European Convention on Human
Rights.302 Applying its own precedents barring “grossly disproportionate”
sentences and favoring rehabilitation, the ECHR held that all prison
sentences must provide some opportunity for “review” to determine
whether “such progress towards rehabilitation has been made . . . that
continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological
grounds.”303
Canadian constitutional law provides additional resources for imagining
alternatives. In a provision that closely echoes the Eighth Amendment,
Canada’s Charter guarantees “the right not to be subjected to any cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment.”304 Yet unlike the United States
Supreme Court, the Canadian Supreme Court—as Vicki Jackson
describes—has infused real meaning into this language, leveraging the
provision to engage in rigorous proportionality review of criminal
sentences.305 For example, the Supreme Court of Canada invalidated a
seven-year mandatory minimum for narcotics distribution offenses as grossly
disproportionate.306 Of course, a seven-year sentence frankly appears quite
lenient in comparison to some of the sentences that the United States
Supreme Court has upheld against Eighth Amendment challenges.

301
302
303

304
305
306

and of terrorism . . . .”). The Constitute Project’s online search tool yields 75 constitutions with a
“prohibition of capital punishment” provision. Explore Constitutions, CONSTITUTE PROJECT
https://www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en&key=cappun&status=in_force (last visited Nov.
12, 2018).
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995–96 (1991).
Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 44.
Id. Exemplifying the disparity between European and American punishment practices, that
decision only directly affected one country, because every other European country had already
abolished LWOP legislatively. And that country was the United Kingdom, which had only fortynine prisoners serving LWOP. Dominic Casciani, Killers’ Life Terms ‘Breach Their Human Rights,’
BBC NEWS (July 9, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-23230419. As of 2009, there were
more than 41,000 prisoners serving LWOP in the United States. Ashley Nellis & Ryan S. King,
No Exit: The Expanding Use of Life Sentences in America, SENTENCING PROJECT (July 2009),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/No-Exit-The-ExpandingUse-of-Life-Sentences-in-America.pdf.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B
to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, § 12 (U.K.).
Jackson, supra note 71, at 3186–87.
R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.R. 1045 (Can.); see also Jackson, supra note 71, at 3186–87.
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These comparisons are not intended to suggest that these European and
Canadian decisions have necessarily yielded transformative practical effects
for punishment practices on the ground. To the contrary, advocates report
disappointment that these decisions have subsequently been interpreted
and enforced in relatively limited ways.307 To be sure, were the United
States to move toward similar doctrine there would still remain the separate
question of how to translate the doctrine into meaningful practical change.
Nevertheless, even if purely at the conceptual level, comparative
constitutional law provides examples of more robust ways of defining the
constitutional limitations on punishment.
C. Towards an Anti-Carceral Originalism?
Originalists might object that a “carceral skeptic” reading of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause patently or perhaps even laughably
contravenes the clause’s original meaning. Clearly, the Eighth Amendment
contemplates the continued existence of punishment, of which
imprisonment is a well-known form. However, a jurisprudence oriented in
skepticism toward extremely harsh prison sentences would not necessarily be
incompatible with originalism. One possible path to an anti-carceral
originalism, although admittedly somewhat far afield from the current thrust
of originalist scholarship and doctrine, would be to reinfuse Eighth
Amendment interpretation with a more holistic appreciation for the
Framers’ historical and ideological context. American Enlightenment
thinkers shared a fundamental belief that “the present should be better than
the past and the future better than the present,” and that “reason and
empirical data” should guide the path of progress, “rather than inherited
tradition.”308 Legal historian Erin Braatz argues that there is no meaningful
way to interpret the Eighth Amendment except within this late-eighteenthcentury “milieu” of ferment and experimentation, including
experimentation in the law and practice of punishment.309 All of the framers
admired Beccaria, the inaugurator of modern proportionality thinking; they
all considered the ongoing project of moderating punishments to constitute
one of the essential projects of “civilizing” progress; and they all agreed that
307

308
309

E-mail from Sharon Dolovich, Professor of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law, to Sara Mayeux Assistant
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law Sch. (September 30, 2018, 6:02 PM) (on file with author). I
thank Sharon Dolovich for suggesting this point and for sharing with me her impressions from
conversations with British and Canadian colleagues.
CAROLINE WINTERER, AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENTS: PURSUING HAPPINESS IN THE AGE OF
REASON 1–2 (2016).
See generally Braatz, supra note 82.
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it was not yet clear where this process of “civilizing” punishment might
ultimately end.310 The phrase “cruel and unusual” was itself intended to
capture, Braatz argues, that ongoing dynamism, not to freeze constitutional
limits on punishment in some static place.311
But even without going down that path, there is also fodder for a more
anti-carceral reading of the Eighth Amendment in existing originalist
scholarship. In fact, some of the leading scholarly originalist interpretations
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause are already quite compatible
with skepticism about the present-day United States’ historically anomalous
use of imprisonment. For instance, John Stinneford makes an originalist
argument that extremely long prison sentences for certain crimes might
violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause because, in Stinneford’s
view, the original meaning of “cruel” is “unjustly harsh”—without
requiring any specific intent to cause pain—while “unusual” means
“contrary to long usage.”312 The Eighth Amendment thus prohibits,
Stinneford argues, not only the revival of ancient forms of torture but also
“cruel innovation in punishment.”313
Applying this interpretation,
Stinneford concludes, might render unconstitutional relatively novel
components of the contemporary carceral state, such as long-term solitary
confinement.314

310
311
312
313
314

Id. at 427, 429–30.
Id. at 410 & n.18
Stinneford, Cruel, supra note 82, at 445–47; see also Stinneford, Unusual, supra note 82, at 1745.
Stinneford, Cruel, supra note 82, at 446–47.
Id. at 502–03 & n.388; see also id. at 504–06 (discussing the harms of very long prison terms).
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CONCLUSION
This Article analyzes the judicial rhetoric in the Roberts Court’s trio of
juvenile LWOP cases in search of insight into the Justices’ underlying
assumptions about how the Constitution relates to the present crisis of mass
incarceration. In Graham, Miller, and Montgomery, a slim majority of the
Court reads the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause to permit very long prison terms, subject to special procedural
requirements for certain exceptional groups. Drawing on longstanding
cultural tropes of adolescence as a time of flux, the Court constructs youth as
the paradigmatic such group. This perspective might be called “carceral
proceduralism.” For the Justices in the majority in the juvenile LWOP
cases, adolescents have uniquely (but transitorily) malleable personalities and
thus cannot be sentenced to irrevocable forms of punishment without
certain procedural safeguards, such as individualized sentencing
determinations and regular parole hearings. The dissenting Justices in the
juvenile LWOP cases—whose views could soon command a majority, given
the retirement of Justice Kennedy—read the Eighth Amendment instead
from a perspective that might be called “carceral conservatism.” In this
view, imprisonment is a positive good that promotes public safety, and
courts should therefore read the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
narrowly, in order to avoid intruding upon the state prerogative to imprison.
What both wings of the Court share—at least on the evidence thus
far—is a baseline assumption that adults (at least for purposes of
constitutional analysis) can be assumed to have fixed characters, are
potentially incorrigible, and thus can be subjected to permanent forms of
punishment including life-without-parole. The archetypal adolescent that
emerges from Graham and Miller is not necessarily incorrigible. The
archetypal adult is potentially irredeemable, and thus can constitutionally
be written off for all time.315 Thus, the juvenile LWOP cases should not be
misunderstood as harbingers of genuinely robust constitutional limits on
punishment. Writing in dissent in Miller, Justice Alito describes the
Constitution as a relatively weak source of limits on criminal punishment,
opining that the Eighth Amendment “for the most part . . . leaves questions
of sentencing policy to be determined by Congress and the state
legislatures.”316 While Justice Alito accused the Miller majority of violating

315
316

For a provocative argument that this tendency in American criminal law renders it “evil,” see
Koppelman, supra note 261.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 515 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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this background rule, in fact Miller is perfectly consistent with the general
principle that there are in the United States few meaningful constitutional
limits on punishment. For critics of mass incarceration, that may be a
frightening prospect.

